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PROPERTY AND PRECAUTION 
 
Lee Anne Fennell
*
 
 
Property in land suffers from an unacknowledged precautionary deficit. 
Ownership is dispensed in standardized blocks of monopoly control that are 
routinely retained in their entirety until someone raises an issue regarding 
an actual or potential incompatible land use. This arrangement, which 
encourages owners to take sustained, unpriced draws against a limited 
stock of future flexibility, sets the stage for future impasse as inconsistent 
plans develop. It also makes property an unnecessarily accident-prone 
institution, given the role that bargaining failure plays in producing costly 
land use conflicts. Expanding the slate of potential precautions beyond 
owners‟ locational and operational choices to include their choices about 
the strength and content of their own entitlements offers new traction on 
land use disputes. It also presents interesting institutional and theoretical 
challenges. In this essay, I propose using a local option exchange to 
confront owners with the opportunity costs of maintaining veto power over 
unused, low-valued rights.  Enabling owners to relinquish property-rule 
protection of such rights before conflicts arise could make property more 
flexible and communicative, and hence reduce the costs of incompatible 
land uses. This approach requires rethinking the limits of customization in 
property bundles and the potential for owner participation in entitlement 
definition.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On a Coasean analysis, land use inefficiencies boil down to breakdowns 
in bargaining.
1
  For decades, the economic analysis of property rights has 
focused on ways to sidestep these bargaining failures, whether through 
well-chosen initial entitlement assignments or mandatory liability rules. Yet 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.  For very helpful comments and conversations, I am 
grateful to Omri Ben-Shahar, Mary Anne Case, Eric Claeys, Aziz Huq, Edward Iacobucci, Gregory Keating, 
Jonathan Masur, Richard McAdams, Jonathan Nash, Eduardo Peñalver, Ariel Porat, Julie Roin, Jennifer Rothman, 
Theodore Seto, Troy Rule, Warren Schwartz, Christopher Serkin, and participants in the 2011 annual meeting of 
the American Law and Economics Association, the Property, Tort, and Private Law Theory Conference at the 
University of Southern California Law School, a University of Toronto Law and Economics Workshop, and  
faculty workshops at Loyola Law School Los Angeles, UCLA School of Law, and the University of Chicago Law 
School.  I thank John O‘Hara and Eric Singer for excellent research assistance, and the Stuart C. and JoAnn 
Nathan Faculty Fund for financial support.     
1 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).   
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the idea that owners might voluntarily reconfigure their entitlements to 
reduce the costs of future transactions has received surprisingly little 
attention. This omission is puzzling, given that property rights typically 
embed veto powers that can create potent impediments to efficient 
outcomes.
2
   In this essay, I examine the advance concession of property 
rule protection as a potential precautionary measure capable of reducing the 
incidence and cost of land use conflicts. This approach  follows logically 
from a view of incompatible land uses (and thwarted land use changes) as 
slow-motion collisions, given the role that bargaining impasse plays in these 
crashes. Owners‘ choices about the strength and shape of their property 
entitlements, no less than their decisions about where to locate or how to 
conduct a particular enterprise, influence how inconsistent plans for real 
property will play out.  It follows that these entitlement decisions could 
represent a locus of precautionary efforts.   
Property scholars working in law and economics are no strangers to the 
use of tort-related principles and frameworks. Foundational work by Ronald 
Coase and by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed
3
 intentionally blurs 
the line between property and torts.
4
 Property theorists have likewise 
adapted Calabresi‘s approach to accident costs to their subjects of inquiry.5 
But new insights might be gleaned from explicitly thinking about land use 
conflicts as a type of low-speed collision in which entitlement structure 
                                                 
2  Whether the strategic holdout problems associated with property rule protection should be classed as a 
subset of transaction costs or treated as a separate set of impediments to bargains is open to question.  See, e.g., 
Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 928 n. 92 (2004) (collecting cites); cf. HAROLD 
DEMSETZ, FROM ECONOMIC MAN TO ECONOMIC SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE INSTITUTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM 116-17 (2008) (classifying free-rider problems as ―ownership costs‖ rather than ―transaction 
costs‖).  In this essay, I will refer to holdout costs as a subset of transaction costs, while emphasizing their unique 
connection to the institution of property as presently configured.   
3 Coase, supra note 1; Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).   
4 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3, at 1089 (noting the need for a ―unified perspective‖ on 
property and torts and offering a framework ―integrating the various legal relationships treated by these 
subjects‖); Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1 
(1985) (using precaution as a unifying principle across doctrinal boundaries, building on Coase‘s work); Thomas 
W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 378-79 
(describing and critiquing the ―torts perspective‖ on property rights found in the work of Coase and Cooter). The 
influence of Coase and of Calabresi and Melamed on property theory and the analysis of land use conflicts has 
been well  noted.  See, e.g., Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA 
L. REV. 775,  785-803 (1986);  Merrill & Smith, supra, at 366-83.  
5
 Calabresi‘s approach to accident costs calls for minimizing the sum of accident costs, prevention costs, and 
administrative costs.  GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-31 (1970).  This framework has since 
been applied to land use questions, among other legal contexts.  See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to 
Zoning:  Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 687-91 (1973); see also 
NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN 
AMERICA 135 (2010) (applying Calabresi‘s framework to order-maintenance and crime control within cities); 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 32-33 (1995)  (suggesting that Calabresi‘s 
formulation captures ―the social function of law‖); Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi‟s The Costs of Accidents: 
A Reassessment, 64 MD L. REV. 12, 15 (2005) (describing Calabresi‘s framework as ―simple and useful‖ if ―not 
entirely satisfactory‖ and noting its applicability ―to a wide variety of law-regulated activities, whether accidents, 
which were Calabresi‘s focus, or pollution, land use, contracts, or virtually any other social activity with which 
the law is concerned‖).    
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itself represents a potentially dangerous element.
6
  The design of property 
rights, I suggest, represents an underappreciated margin of adjustment 
through which we might seek to minimize the costs of land use conflicts 
and their prevention.
7
  
That design choices embed precautions and thereby influence the 
overall costs of accidents is obvious when we are talking about whether cars 
should be built like slow-moving tanks
8
 or equipped with ―spongy 
bumpers.‖9  Yet property scholarship, although steeped in the analysis of 
entitlements,
10
 has done little to examine whether we have designed 
property rights packages that deliver the right combination of speed, 
maneuverability, crash-resistance, flexibility, and protection.
11
  Reflection 
on this question reveals that we have, in fact, inherited an institution that is 
remarkably accident prone—so rigid and brittle, in fact, that new and 
incompatible uses must be constantly managed through coercive action.  
Property law delivers highly potent, standardized blocks of monopoly 
control to landowners by default,
12
 but offers no simple way for owners to 
downgrade their protection selectively and voluntarily in advance of a 
conflict. When incompatible land use plans arise, coercive governmental 
action often becomes necessary to override owners‘ veto power.13  But 
                                                 
6 The accident analogy has been used by a few scholars in land use contexts, although in a narrower manner 
than I employ it here.  See, e.g., Eric Kades, Avoiding Takings „Accidents‟: A Tort Perspective on Takings Law, 28 
U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1263 (1994) (analogizing government condemnation to accidents for purposes of 
exploring the potential for private insurance to substitute for government-provided compensation); Louis Kaplow, 
An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 563 (1986) (distinguishing the accident 
scenario from that of legal transitions); see also Eric Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and 
Economics, and Natural Property Rights,  85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1386 (2010)  (describing an ―accident 
law and economics‖ paradigm concerned with efficiency and discussing its applicability to ―land-use torts‖).  Also 
distinct from my inquiry are analyses of actual accidents (such as chemical leaks or explosions) that occur on 
land.  See, e.g., Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete Institutionalism,  98 GEO. L.J. 
863 (2010).   
7 Efficiency analysis has often focused on minimizing these two sets of costs. See CALABRESI, supra note 5, 
at 26 (―Apart from the requirements of justice, I take it as axiomatic that the principal function of accident law is 
to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.‖); Cooter, supra note 4, at 2 
(developing a ―model of precaution‖ that examines the interaction between ―the direct cost of harm and the cost of 
precautions against it‖); see also text accompanying notes 33-34, supra.  
8 See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A 
PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 9 (1985) (using this example to illustrate costs of accident prevention).   
9 CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 136-39 (using ―spongy bumpers‖ to illustrate an efficient precaution).    
10 A large body of economically oriented work on land use entitlements exists, primarily building on the 
insights of Coase, supra note 1, and Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 3.  See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 
4, at 366-83 (describing these influences on the economic analysis of property rights).    
11 Recent work has, however, given greater attention to the ex ante effects of the legal rules surrounding 
property entitlements.  See Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty about Property 
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2008) (observing that the literature has seen a shift to ―ex ante concerns—
developing a legal structure that minimizes the risk of conflict before it arises‖). The possibility that the 
assignment and protection of entitlements could affect the likelihood and costliness of later conflict has been 
explored in, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001).  See also text accompanying notes 48-53, infra. 
12 See, e.g., Stewart E.  Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55 (1987) 
(describing property‘s ―rigid ‗geometric box‘ allocation  of rights‖ as well as some departures from it). Property 
rule protection over unique assets confers a monopoly power because it gives owners the unqualified right to veto 
any proposed transaction.  See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3, at 1092. 
13 In other words, exclusion gives way to various forms of governance.  See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion 
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because these overrides are typically insensitive to the actual valuations of 
the entitlement-holders (which may be quite heterogeneous), they generate 
new inefficiencies.
14
   
By routinely granting broader monopoly power than is useful to owners 
and making it costless to hold onto, existing property arrangements 
needlessly impede efficient transactions that could avoid land uses conflicts 
and the subsequent application of coercive overrides. Meanwhile, legal 
rules that privilege temporal priority, protect existing uses, and base 
compensation on actual rather than optimal investments, prompt owners to 
aggressively barrel towards a future collision.
15
 Owners are thus 
systematically encouraged to hold onto more extensive property-rule-
protected packages and use them more aggressively than they would if they 
internalized the increased accident costs associated with doing so. The 
results are reminiscent of drivers who choose heavy SUVs to improve their 
personal crash outcomes without considering the effects of their decisions 
on the destructiveness of crashes.
16
 Although the resulting inefficiencies 
have not escaped notice, land use conflicts are rarely approached as 
collisions that might benefit from precautionary changes to property 
entitlements themselves.  
What, then, would it mean for property entitlements to incorporate cost-
effective precautions—the ownership equivalent of crumple zones or brake  
lights?  For efficiency‘s sake, we would want low-valuing users to cede 
their entitlements to higher-valuing ones in the event of a conflict, 
preferably through a voluntary market transaction.  But by the time such a 
conflict arises, a bilateral monopoly dynamic has typically taken hold that 
makes such a transaction uncertain and costly.
17
 Scholars have put 
enormous energy into devising ways to reproduce the desired result, but 
coercion, whether through liability rules or otherwise, has been an 
entrenched part of the story.
18
  What has received much less attention is the 
                                                                                                                            
Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) These 
governance mechanisms need not be top-down command-and-control style restrictions (although they do often 
take that form).  For example, liability rules permit an owner‘s prerogatives to be overridden, at a price, without 
her consent and thus offer a way around the monopoly blocking power inherent in property rule protection.  See, 
e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092, 1107. 
14 This is a standard concern about eminent domain, but it applies to all liability rules.  See, e.g., Richard A. 
Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2093 (1997). 
15 See text accompanying notes 28-29, infra. 
16 Such problems in the road accident arena are by no means fully addressed by existing tort law, but at least 
they are recognized at the level of theory.  See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 136-39 (discussing bumper 
design as a potential precaution); Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence: 
Defining the Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and Victims, 78 
GEO. L.J. 241, 254, 255-57 (1989) (observing that ―one‘s ability to avoid harm while driving is affected by one‘s 
choice of the car‘s features and one‘s skill as a driver‖ and presenting an example involving brake quality).  
17 See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 12, at 57-58, 69-74 (describing the bilateral monopoly dynamic that can arise 
between neighbors and analyzing its effects on transaction costs and the possibility of an efficient bargain); James 
E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 440, 460-62 (1995). 
18 For some examples of work considering how liability rules (and variations thereon) might be configured 
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possibility that owners could be induced to identify in advance the low-
valued portions of their property packages and release their monopoly grip 
on those elements before a conflict arises.
19
  Designing entitlements to 
encourage such advance concessions would allow those individual 
landowners most likely to be the ―cheapest cost avoiders‖20 in future 
conflicts to self-identify and commit in advance to yielding.   
To bring this idea down to earth, consider recent conflicts that have 
arisen between households that wish to grow tall trees and their neighbors 
who wish to make use of solar panels.
21
  Most households do not plan to 
occlude the ―solar corridors‖ used by their neighbors, yet they lack any 
method or motivation for conveying those intentions to in-movers who are 
interested in solar power.
22
  Such in-movers could, of course, go door to 
door in an attempt to negotiate negative easements, but as soon as they raise 
the question of buying such a right, the dynamic between the parties 
changes in ways that are unlikely to be conducive to a quick and low-cost 
resolution.  Concerns about this issue have prompted a number of scholars 
to consider the use of liability rules that would avoid the need for 
individualized pairwise bargains.
23
  Yet again, such approaches focus on 
resolving conflicts that, in an important sense, are already in progress.    
Suppose a local government anticipating this issue offered a specified 
payment (or, more likely, a property tax reduction) to any household that 
agreed to make a solar easement available for later unilateral purchase by a 
neighbor at the then-going rate.
24
  Notice that it would not be necessary for 
the governmental entity to actually buy up the easement in advance; rather, 
it could acquire an option on the easement and thereby remove the 
landowner‘s power to veto a later transaction.25  The local government 
                                                                                                                            
to address conflicts, see sources cited in infra notes 43 and 46.  See also text accompanying notes 198-199, infra 
(discussing role of compulsion in aggregation efforts).   
19 Using call and put options to overcome monopoly holdout dynamics is familiar within the scholarly 
literature.  However, most of the work does not contemplate using these tools before the onset of a disagreement 
about uses. An exception is literature considering the advance use of options in the eminent domain context.  See 
infra note 31 and accompanying text.   
20  CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 136-40; see also Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land 
Use Regulations, 84 NYU L. REV. 1222, 1272 (2009). 
21 In California, for example, high profile litigation among neighbors on this issue prompted a legislative 
change.  See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Trees Block Solar Panels, and a Feud Ends in U.S. Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
7, 2008 (reporting on the dispute and the court‘s judgment); Troy A. Rule, Shadows on the Cathedral: Solar 
Access in a Different Light, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 874-75 (describing amendments to California‘s Solar Shade 
Control Act); see also Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217 (2009) (discussing various approaches 
to disputes over solar access). 
22 The problem is a general one.  As Sterk explains, ―a party unaware of potential competing uses is unlikely 
to initiate negotiations to eliminate conflicts[,]‖ leaving it to ―the encroacher or infringer‖ to raise the issue.  Sterk, 
supra note 11, at 1295.    
23 See Rule, supra note 21, at 883-92; Sara C. Bronin, Modern Lights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 910-14 
(2009). 
24 The phrase ―then-going rate‖ suppresses a number of complexities that will be discussed below.  The basic 
idea is simple, however: a landowner would voluntarily expose herself to a liability rule regime.   
25 The government‘s original offer amounts to a put option: households have the right, but not the obligation, 
to force a sale at the stated price. The subject of this put option—the thing that the government agrees to buy—is a 
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could then allow any landowner who wishes to make use of a solar collector 
on an adjacent parcel to obtain and exercise the option to acquire the 
easement (at the going rate), with proceeds forwarded to the relinquishing 
landowner.  I will expand on this intuitive example below.  For now, it is 
sufficient to note how this arrangement might induce those who place a 
relatively low value on particular land use entitlements—here, the option to 
grow tall trees or erect other tall structures—to step forward and receive 
compensation for returning a measure of flexibility to the common pool.
26
  
Involving owners in the process of voluntarily customizing their own 
entitlements offers an opportunity similar to that facilitated in the 
intellectual property context by Creative Commons licenses, which address 
a similar problem and likewise seek to reduce transaction costs.
27
  
Another way to think about this approach is as a mechanism for 
countering excessive entrenchment in land use. A large literature on 
transition relief, as well as on specific manifestations like compensation for 
takings, analyzes the inefficiencies that may follow from shielding owners 
from the effects of legal change.
28
 For example, there is a moral hazard 
associated with a just compensation rule that extends to improvements as 
well as to the land itself, because people do not bear the full costs of their 
investment decisions.
29
  While much of the work in this vein has focused on 
the merits of revamping or eliminating transition relief by fiat, some 
scholars have investigated how parties might voluntarily render themselves 
more vulnerable to later legal change,
30
 including through advance sales of 
options that constrain later compensation.
31
 Mechanisms that would allow 
                                                                                                                            
call option on a solar easement.   See infra Part II.A. 
26 To be sure, the flexibility in question is spatially situated and hence not physically collected in an 
undifferentiated heap for anyone to draw on for any purpose in any place.  Nonetheless, it contributes to a 
collective fund of flexibility that makes it easier for people to carry out projects involving land.  The idea that 
landowners withdraw flexibility from a social fund is suggested in T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value 
Taxation with the Internalization of Spatial Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 347 (1990).   
27 Consistent with this analogy, Creative Commons licenses and similar grants of access to intellectual 
property have been described as ―intellectual easements.‖ R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: 
Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1032 (2003). 
28 See, e.g., DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE 40-42 (2000); Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 571-72 (1984); Kaplow, 
supra note 6, at 527-28; Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental 
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677 (2007); Serkin, supra note 
20, at 1283-87; see also Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition 
Relief, 85 NYU L. REV. 391 (2010); Jonathan Remy Nash,  Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to 
Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809 (2009).  
29 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should 
Compensation be Paid? 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and 
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 270-
75 (1988); Cooter, supra note 4, at 19-21; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE 
CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 152-53 (3d ed. 2005) (summarizing the moral hazard problem and collecting 
sources).   
30 Providing ―transactional flexibility‖ through a menu of governmental alternatives incorporating different 
degrees of transition risk represents one such approach.  SHAVIRO, supra note 28, at 38-40.   
31 See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 4, at 22-23; Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 29, at 274-75.  See also Florenz 
Plassmann and T. Nicolaus Tideman,  Applying Marginal Cost Pricing: Efficiency and Fairness in Takings and 
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individuals to force advance sales of selected elements of their ownership 
veto powers are a natural extension of these ideas.
32
  
Just as safer automobile design does not eliminate the need for speed 
limits, well-designed roads, or liability consequences, neither would 
offering landowners greater opportunities to customize their property 
entitlements operate as a stand-alone solution.  Nonetheless, more flexible 
entitlement design could substitute at least sometimes for more costly 
precautionary measures, such as blanket bans on particular land uses.   
Indeed, a significant advantage of the approach I outline here lies in its 
ability to preserve a greater degree of owner autonomy than a system that 
depends upon ordinary liability rules to get entitlements out of the hands of 
low-valuers and into the hands of high-valuers, or that simply bans larger 
and larger sets of uses. Allowing property owners to consummate land use 
deals without the interference of a bilateral monopoly dynamic can support 
higher levels of voluntary transactions and richer property packages.  
The analysis proceeds in three parts.  In Part I, I show how analogizing 
land use conflicts to accidents, despite some evident differences, yields 
useful lessons about the nature of precaution and the alternative paths to 
achieving it.  Here, I explain how the undue rigidity built into standardized 
property entitlements contributes to conflicts and costly efforts at conflict 
prevention.  Part II examines how precautionary land use entitlements  
might work in a variety of contexts, starting with the tree-versus-solar 
scenario introduced above.  Specifically, I explore how an institutional 
alternative—an option exchange—could confront owners with the 
opportunity costs of their draws against land use flexibility, and thereby 
reduce land use conflicts. Part III considers how a precaution-based 
understanding of entitlements fits into ongoing debates about the nature and 
meaning of property. Here, I anticipate and counter some objections, 
including concerns about the potential inconsistency of increased 
entitlement customization with the numerus clausus doctrine.    
 
I.  THE COSTS OF LAND USE ACCIDENTS 
 
In The Costs of Accidents, Guido Calabresi pointed out the fallacy of a 
single-minded focus on minimizing accidents; the relevant challenge, at 
least from an efficiency perspective, is to minimize the sum of accident 
                                                                                                                            
Land Assembly, and Accuracy in Assessment, All in One Fell Swoop (2009) available at: 
http://works.bepress.com/florenz_plassmann/1 (proposing an alternative that involves an integrated system of self-
assessed valuation and compensation for placing property at risk of condemnation that is designed to 
simultaneously address the moral hazard problem, the holdout problem, and the problem of insufficiently 
deterring governmental takings).  
32 This is especially so given that put options have already been recognized as alternatives to traditional 
liability rules for the resolution of private land use disputes. See, e.g. Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 
VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (1998).   
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costs and prevention costs.
33
  The same principle holds true in the land use 
context.
34
 Yet most real-world land use controls prohibit uses in a 
categorical manner, running up prevention costs with little regard for the 
overall goal of cost minimization.
35
  Efficiency-oriented scholarship on land 
use conflicts has, in contrast, focused primarily on what might be termed 
―crash management‖—how to most cheaply resolve conflicts that are 
already in progress.
36
  Although a few scholars have given attention to how 
entitlement design might influence ex ante choices,
37
 the full range of 
mechanisms through which the likelihood and severity of future conflicts 
might be reduced has yet to be examined. Equally important is the 
possibility that entitlement design could reduce resort to costly methods of 
preventing conflicts ex ante, such as strict separations of uses or outright 
prohibitions. This Part will identify and examine the precautionary gap in 
existing approaches and explain how attending to the hazards of default 
property configurations points toward some alternatives.   
 
A.  From Road Accidents to Land Use Collisions 
 
Land use conflicts develop over time and typically lack a dramatic focal 
event analogous to tort law‘s paradigmatic car crash. What is more, the 
impacts that result from incompatible land uses are rarely ―accidental‖ in 
the usual sense; the uses are intended, even if their specific deleterious 
effects on neighboring parties are not.
38
  As an initial matter then, we must 
consider how (or even if) a land use conflict is like a collision.   
 
1. The Accident Analogy 
 
The ―crash-like‖ aspects of land use conflicts come down to this: the 
costly collision in time and space of two or more socially valuable but 
                                                 
33 CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 26. Administrative costs represent an important subset of the overall costs 
that society seeks to minimize.  Id. at 28. 
34 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 5, at 687-91. 
35 Both public controls (zoning) and private controls (covenants) may embody these excesses.  See, e.g., 
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unbundling Homeownership: Regional Reforms from the Inside Out, 119 YALE L.J. 1904, 
1906 (2010) (―Since local governments (and private developers) can rarely calibrate the level of regulation to 
residents‘ true preferences, ex ante prohibitions frequently impose excessive ‗prevention costs.‘‖). 
36 See Bebchuk, supra note 11, at  602-03 (observing that most work on entitlements and externalities 
approaches the problem from an ex post perspective that ―take[s] as given both the presence of [the conflicting 
uses] and their potential costs and benefits from their respective activities‖).    
37 See id. at 603 (adopting an ex ante approach that examines how choices about entitlements influences 
earlier decisions, such as where to locate, what activities to pursue, and how much to invest in them); text 
accompanying notes 49-53, infra (discussing related lines of analysis).   
38  Although the term ―intentional‖ can be used in a variety of ways, its doctrinal meaning in the nuisance 
context requires only that the defendant carry on an activity known to produce certain effects with substantial 
certainty; a specific intention to harm the plaintiff is not required.  See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 
S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953); Jeff L. Lewin, Comparative Nuisance, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1009, 1027 (1989). 
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incompatible private land use agendas.
39
 Although classification questions 
abound, it is generally helpful to recognize that a given landowner‘s plans 
for her property might collide with those of another owner either because 
one of the parties undertakes an activity on her parcel that generates a 
negative spillover (or withdraws a positive spillover)
40
 or because one of the 
owners exercises a blocking veto power over a property input that, due to its 
precise location in space and time, is essential to the other owner‘s plans. 
Land use accidents, then, can be thought of as spatially and temporally 
sensitive use-thwartings that are produced by the conflicting land use aims 
of private parties.
41
 These thwartings, like the twisted metal and broken 
bones that ordinary road accidents produce, are undeniably costly—which 
is not to say that they are always worth the cost of avoiding.       
The analogy is helpful because it points to gaps in our understanding of 
the slate of available precautions.  In  land use contexts as in road accidents, 
ex ante regulations and ex post liability are used in various combinations to 
control the primary behavior of the parties, including decisions about when 
and where they will be and what they will do while there.  Zoning and 
covenants further structure how land uses interact, acting in part like 
concrete barriers or road blockades to keep uses apart, and in part like 
directional signs or lane designations to induce self-sorting.
42
  But because 
land use accidents can be averted by bargains as well as by actions to 
separate or regulate uses, an owner‘s decision to make her property 
entitlements more amenable to future bargains represents another possible 
precaution. In other words, the veto powers landowners retain can be as 
hazardous to efficiency as the actions they affirmatively take.  Yet little 
attention is given to how owners‘ choices about entitlement configuration 
and strength—the design of the vehicles in which conflicting property rights 
arrive on the scene—might reduce the costs of land use conflicts and their 
prevention.        
   
2. Crash Management and Beyond 
 
Many scholars have employed and built upon Calabresi and Melamed‘s 
                                                 
39 Larissa Katz has developed the idea of owners as ―agenda setters.‖ Larissa Katz, Exclusion and 
Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L. J.  275, 289-93 (2008).  I focus here on private land use agendas 
to distinguish conflicts stemming from landowners‘ primary behavior from those produced by the actions of 
governments or other collectives.  Governmental intervention is often the result of actual or anticipated difficulties 
resolving these private conflicts.  
40 Whether a particular impact is understood as a negative spillover or the withdrawal of a positive spillover 
depends upon societal judgments about the appropriate harm/benefit baseline in use.  See Frank I. Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1165, 1196-1200 (1967). 
41 They are therefore distinguishable from the more general-purpose agenda-thwartings caused by factors 
like low wealth or governmental prohibitions.     
42 See, e.g., LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME 41-43, 69-70 (2009) (discussing role of land use 
controls in both restricting land uses and inducing self-sorting).   
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framework to examine how best to assign and protect contested land use 
entitlements.
43
 But as Lucian Bebchuk‘s pathbreaking work emphasizes,   
this scholarship has generally approached the efficiency inquiry from an ex 
post perspective that takes the existence of the adjacent incompatible uses 
as a given.
44
 Treating a land use dispute as a slow motion wreck highlights 
the shortcomings of this approach.  We would think it odd to focus all our 
attention regarding the costs of road accidents on deciding which party to a 
crash should bear the brunt of the impact. Yet the standard economic 
approach to land use conflicts does something quite analogous. 
To see this point, imagine that a roadway collision could be magically 
slowed down by enough orders of magnitude to permit the parties (through 
their agents) to resort to the courts after a crash has become inevitable, but 
before it has been determined how the in-kind costs of that crash (fatalities, 
injuries, and vehicle damage) will be distributed among the parties. The 
drivers, let us assume, can still influence that distribution through their 
actions in the split-seconds before the crash occurs.
45
  Suppose the finder of 
fact determines that the total amount of damage would be minimized by 
having one driver or the other steer her car (nonfatally, let‘s say, but 
catastrophically) into an adjacent brick wall rather than plow head-on into 
the other party.  The court could then choose from Calabresi and Melamed‘s 
classic quartet of alternatives by granting either Driver 1 or Driver 2 the 
entitlement to continue unscathed (and imposing on her opposite number 
the duty to crash into the wall) and by protecting that entitlement with either 
a property rule or a liability rule.
46
  Such an exercise is not incoherent, yet it 
                                                 
43 Foundational pieces written during the quarter-century following The Cathedral‟s publication include, for 
example, Symposium, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, 106 
YALE L.J. 2081 (1997); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic 
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal 
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, 
Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440 (1995); Madeline 
Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822 (1993); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance 
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980);  A. 
Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-
Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979).  Numerous more recent works, some of which are cited and 
discussed here, have continued to build on the Calabresi and Melamed framework. 
44 Bebchuk, supra note 11, at 602-03.  As Bebchuk explains, most existing treatments considered the 
distribution of value between the parties ex post to be irrelevant to efficiency (even if relevant for other normative 
reasons); in fact, the distribution ex post would have important ex ante impacts on efficiency.  Id. at 604; see also 
Lucian Bebchuck, Ex Ante Investments and Ex Post Externalities, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper 
No. 397, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=297091 (2001) (demonstrating this point formally).      
45 There is empirical support for the possibility that choices made in the midst of a crash can influence 
within-vehicle patterns of injury and death.  See Ilya Beylin et al., Finding Love in the Wreckage: Estimating 
Spousal Altruism with Data from Fatal Car Accidents (working paper 2009).  That similar choices can affect loss 
distributions as between the occupants of different vehicles is memorialized in the lyrics of at least one country 
song.  Jimmy Martin, Widow Maker, on Jimmy Martin‘s Greatest Hits (King Records, 2004)  (ballad recounting a 
diesel driver‘s decision to steer his rig into a ditch, with fatal consequences, to avoid colliding with another 
vehicle and killing the people therein).  
46 The court  might also adopt one of the more esoteric alternatives that scholars have devised to force 
information—such as decoupled, dual-chooser, or higher-order liability rules.  See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, 
Modular Liability Rules, 24 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 269 (2004); Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal 
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puts the emphasis in the wrong place. It frames the efficiency analysis 
solely in terms of getting the entitlement (here, to emerge from the 
encounter unscathed) into the hands of the party who valued it most highly, 
without regard to the parties‘ earlier actions (such as speeding or driving on 
the wrong side of the road) that made the crash inevitable.
47
 But this is 
precisely how the efficient resolution of land use disputes is usually framed.   
To be sure, several lines of scholarship have moved beyond mere crash 
management. For example, Bebchuk‘s work stresses the impact of ex post 
entitlement assignment and protection on ex ante location and activity 
choices.
48
 Closely related are analyses of doctrines like ―coming to the 
nuisance‖ that influence future adjacency between incompatible uses.49 
Another important strand of the literature addresses the incentive effects of 
transition relief, including compensation requirements—issues that Robert 
Cooter has incorporated into a larger ―model of precaution.‖50 Other work 
has examined how altering components of the property bundle, such as 
alienability, can have ex ante effects on acquisition choices.
51
 The 
possibility that entitlement configuration could have repercussions into the 
future has also featured in scholarship considering the impact of certain 
kinds of fragmentation or alienability-limiting provisions.
52
 Another 
interesting and relevant line of analysis examines how different entitlement 
regimes influence the gathering and  use of information in managing 
conflict.
53
 
Despite these important contributions, property theorists have not yet 
fully come to terms with how entitlement design influences the prospects 
                                                                                                                            
Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rights, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Sergey I. Knysh, Paul 
M. Goldbart & Ian Ayres, Instantaneous Liability Rule Auctions: The Continuous Extension of Higher-Order 
Liability Rules 48 (Sept. 2004) (unpublished manuscript). 
47 Of course, the negligence standard typically applied in tort law regularly fails to examine important sets of 
ex ante choices about activity levels.  See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW  21-26 
(1987). Ideally, we would want people to make efficient choices along all margins, including the choice to be on 
the road in that time and place and in that sort of vehicle.   
48 Bebchuk, supra note 11. 
49 See, e.g., Donald Wittman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of “Coming to the 
Nuisance,” 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 557, 558 (1980); Robert Innes, Coming to the Nuisance: Revising Spur in a Model 
of Location Choice, 25 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 286 (2009).  Location choice, along with building decisions, might be 
understood as a type of ―durable precaution‖ that raises interesting issues about optimal transition policy.  See 
Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 74-77 
(2008) (discussing ―durable precautions‖ and grandfathering in the context of land use). 
50 Cooter, supra note 4, at 19-21; see supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
51 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
931, 943 (1985); Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (2009).   
52 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1374 (1993); Frank I. Michelman, 
Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 15-16 (J. 
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 
YALE L.J. 1163, 1176-82 (1999).  
53 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719 (2004) (emphasizing the 
role of information in addressing and coordinating conflicting uses and noting that property systems can be set up 
with ―access-based‖ rules that place informational and coordination responsibilities on the owner or with ―use-
based‖ rules that require officials to gather information); Sterk, supra note 11, at 1288-89, 1295-97 (discussing the 
possibility that property rules will induce excessive search).    
1-Jun-11] PROPERTY AND PRECAUTION 12 
and costs of land use conflicts.  While scholars have devised increasingly 
sophisticated mechanisms for making what amount to intra-crash right-of-
way decisions, they have neglected the land use equivalents of crumple 
zones, safety glass, brake lights, and turn signals.  To see how and why such 
features might be added, it is necessary to consider how property currently 
works. 
 
B.  Property Blocks  
 
 ―Property blocks‖ (considered both as a noun and as a short declarative 
statement) offers a two-word starting point for understanding property and a 
springboard for thinking about precautionary entitlement design.   
 
1. Excess Capacity and Crumple Zones 
 
Property law issues owners standardized blocks of monopoly control 
that dramatically reduce the choices available to nonowners within a 
specified spatial domain. As Henry Smith has emphasized, this 
configuration allows owners to choose among a broad range of uses and 
activities.
54
  But it also carries a significant and largely unrecognized cost 
that can best be understood as a form of excess capacity
55
 in the domain of 
land use flexibility.  Whether measured in terms of space, intensity, or time, 
most owners only use a fraction of their property entitlements. For example,  
residential owners frequently fail to use the full ―envelope‖56 of airspace 
that the prevailing legal regime leaves open to them.   Yet owners typically 
retain property rule protection over the ownership block in its entirety until 
an issue arises—which is to say until a conflict is already in view or in 
progress.
57
  
The point is not that property is being underutilized in the ordinary 
sense; I am not suggesting it would be optimal for owners to trade their 
extra scraps of entitlements with each other until every square inch of space 
is being actively used at every moment in time.  Rather, the unused portions 
                                                 
54 See generally Smith, supra note 53; see also Part III.B.1 
55 The notion of harnessing ―excess capacity‖ in a variety of contexts through nonmarket sharing rather than 
through market transactions is explored in Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the 
Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004).  One of the examples he 
discusses involves real property: an owner can share her land with hikers and hunters in some areas by simply not 
posting or fencing.  Id. at 307-08.  In other land use contexts, however, the inability to easily communicate one‘s 
intentions combine with a lack of shared norms to require somewhat more formal institutional arrangements.  See 
supra Part I.B.3  (describing the communications challenges that certain use rights present).  This is especially 
true where long-run investments by a landowner are at issue that may outlast a given neighbor‘s tenure (or, 
perhaps, her inclination toward generosity).  See, e.g., Rule, supra note 21, at 853 (noting that it can take twenty 
years or more to recoup the cost of solar collectors, even when incentives are offered).   
56 For the idea of an owner‘s full set of development rights as an ―envelope‖ or ―three-dimensional mold,‖ 
see, e.g., ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 29, at 165. 
57 See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 11, at 69-74. 
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of ownership bundles should be viewed as buffers or cushions that, if 
identified, could help coordinate land uses, avoid conflicts, and 
accommodate changes.  In other words, there is plenty of space within 
existing property entitlements to build in crumple zones—entitlements that 
are engineered in advance to yield to a more highly-valued incompatible 
use.   
Ordinary liability rules can accomplish this result in theory, but they 
may be unsuitable where valuations vary widely among owners,
58
 or where 
the unilateral transfer of entitlements is deemed normatively undesirable.  In 
tight-knit communities, norms that eliminate ―hard bargaining‖ may help to 
provide the equivalent of such conflict-reducing buffers.
59
 Other approaches 
that rely on an owner‘s obligation towards others might produce similar 
results.
60
 But where shared norms or a consensus about the applicable 
obligations are lacking, or where heterogeneous valuations make such 
norms or obligations problematic to apply, some other approach is required. 
The basic idea pursued here is to elicit advance relinquishments of veto 
powers as to superfluous or low-valued components of individual owners‘ 
property packages.   
 
2. Unsafe at Any Speed:  Why Property Is Such a Drag 
 
To illustrate the potential costliness of safety measures, Calabresi 
offered the example of cars ―built like tanks‖ that can only go ten miles an 
hour.
61
 While this design configuration would all but eliminate serious road 
accidents, it would also largely erase any gains that cars might otherwise 
have introduced.
62
  Contemplating the stickiness in land uses produced by 
the combination of hard-edged property rights and categorical land use 
controls raises the question of whether we have created a similarly sluggish 
and unresponsive system of property in land.  The question may at first 
seem incoherent.  Land is immobile, and property rights are generally 
                                                 
58 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 53, at 1774-81 (noting risks of undercompensation and overcompensation 
when liability rules are used). 
59 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 88-89 
(1994) (observing that a norm of proportionality in paying for fencing ―sharply truncates the range of permissible 
bargaining positions and hence promises to expedite transactions‖); see also Sterk, supra note 12, at 95-96.  I 
thank John O‘Hara for raising this point.    
60 See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF 
OWNERSHIP 49 (2000)  (describing religious obligations to leave the gleanings at the edges of the field open to all 
takers); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 
(2009)  (arguing that property law should – and to some extent does – recognize a social-obligation norm that 
promotes ―human flourishing‖); see also Part III B.3 (discussing how an ―abuse of right‖ doctrine treats certain 
ways of deploying ownership as inconsistent with owners‘ property packages).  In some cases, owners‘ 
obligations are clear.  For example, the doctrine of necessity provides a context in which owners owe duties and 
consequently lack certain prerogatives.   
61 CALABRESI, supra note 8, at 9.  Calabresi also considers the alternative of a ―racing car‖ design that would 
nonetheless move at a snail‘s pace, but the ―tank‖ offers a more striking image for present purposes. 
62 Id. 
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designed to protect expectations and promote stability.  On this account, the 
very inertia that would be a serious drawback in a product designed to 
deliver mobility might seem like an appealing advantage, or possibly the 
entire point, of an institution like property.
63
  Owners‘ veto powers, which 
are a function of the property rule protection that generally accompanies 
ownership, do a great deal to reduce conflicts and encourage productive 
investment.
64
   Much of the value associated with property rule protection 
passes unnoticed as members of society routinely comply with the in rem 
duties to ―keep off‖ that the property rights of others impose on them.65 
Thus, ownership stops fights over resources before they start and sets the 
stage for trade.
66
   
Property can provide these benefits, however, only by drawing from a 
limited societal store of spatial and temporal flexibility. By giving owners 
the right to refuse transactions, efficient changes in land use can be blocked. 
As a result, ownership carries with it an often unacknowledged 
externality—spatial rigidity.67 The primary difficulty, as commentators have 
noted, is not that elements of the built environment can never be undone 
(they can be, at a price), but rather that accompanying legal protections 
make change cumbersome and costly.
68
 Stripping away those protections 
presents difficulties of its own, as the controversies surrounding the law‘s 
most heavy-handed flexibility restorer, eminent domain, well illustrate.  
Significantly, the ossification that property rights introduce into 
metropolitan land use systems often exceeds the level of stability that 
owners require to pursue their ends.  The challenge, then, is to price the 
draws that owners make against future land use flexibility without 
nullifying the advantages of property itself.  
 
                                                 
63 Property is generally regarded as an inertial institution.  See, e.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 821, 830-32 (2009).   
64 See, e.g., Timothy Besley, Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana, 
103 J. POLIT. ECON. 903 (1995); Erica Field, Property Rights and Investment in Urban Slums, 3 J. Eur. Econ. 
Assoc. 279, 280 (2005).   
65 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 4. 
66 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
Trades and Ecosystems,  83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 131 (1998).  
67 See, e.g., Tideman, supra note 26, at 347 (proposing a tax on the right to remain on a given site that would 
amount to ―a charge for the diminution of social flexibility that results from putting immobile improvements on 
land‖).   
68 See E. D‘Arcy & G. Keogh, Towards a Property Market Paradigm of Urban Change, 29 ENVIRON. & 
PLANNING A 685 (1997) (observing that while the existing stock of buildings influences urban development, the 
property rights bound up in those buildings also constitute ―potentially important constraints on urban change‖); 
Julia D. Mahoney, The Illusion of Perpetuity and the Preservation of Privately Owned Lands, 44 NAT. RES. J. 
573, 595 (2004) (―Although discussions of the reversibility of land use choices tend to focus on the problems 
associated with reconfiguring the physical world, in a number of instances institutional considerations are likely to 
prove the greater impediment to undoing decisions involving land.‖).  There  may be a tendency to overestimate 
the permanence of the building stock itself.  See Jonathan Hiskes, Cities Get Rebuilt More Often Than You Think, 
GRIST, Jan. 22, 2010 (citing prerecession empirical work by Architecture 2030 predicting that ―by the year 2035, 
three-quarters of the building stock will be new or renovated‖). 
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3. Communication Blocks:  Fences and Turn Signals 
 
Property, as Carol Rose has emphasized, is significantly about 
communication—hence the widespread use of fences, stakes, and other 
markers that are wholly ineffective at physically precluding entry.
69
  
Despite centuries of change and increasing interdependence among land 
uses, property has mostly stuck with a simple, gruff message: ―keep off.‖70  
This blunt command does a very effective job of avoiding disputes over 
who is privileged to be on the land, but does little to coordinate potentially 
incompatible uses that do not involve physical invasion.
71
 Revisiting the 
notion of excess capacity will help to clarify. The unused portions of 
landowners‘ property envelopes do a poor job of communicating an 
owner‘s intentions for the space. Of course, people can consult zoning maps 
and recorded covenants to learn how present uses might be expanded 
without running afoul of current law, and we can imagine ways to improve 
salience of the regulatory information available to the public.
72
 Yet even 
these advances would not tell us the value that the landowner places on 
options to use presently unused portions, or whether she stands willing to 
sell them.
73
  
                                                 
69 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 81-88 (1985) 
(examining how property involves communication using a shared language); see also Sterk, supra note 11, at 
1315 (noting that ―an owner who marks off property rights provides information to the universe of potential 
users‖).   
70 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 53, at 1759 (―Typically, things are defined in a rough exclusion-like way, and 
this sends a simple message to the world to ‗keep off.‘‖).  Of course, property does know how to say a number of 
other things (through the use of easements, for example), but it usually lacks any motivation to speak up until an 
argument or negotiation is underway. 
71 One way that property rules might be thought to reduce conflicts is by inducing anyone interested in a 
conflicting use to get in touch with the owner and bargain to a solution.  See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 11, at 1295 
(―Property rules enable the ‗owner‘ of a resource to serve as a clearinghouse for information about the values 
potential users attach to that resource.‖) (citing Smith, supra note 53, at 1728-29);  Rose, supra note 69, at 82 (―if 
I keep my property claims clear, others will know that they should deal with me directly if they want to use my 
property‖).  In other words, it might seem unnecessary for property itself to speak if owners can listen.  There are 
at least two problems, however.  First, there may be high search costs in figuring out who owns what in order to 
even initiate a bargain. See Sterk, supra note 11, at 1296.  Second, the bargaining itself may present a bilateral 
monopoly problem.  See Sterk, supra note 12, at 58-59.  My approach suggests that the owner may be better at 
defining the bounds of her own entitlement and worse at being a ―clearinghouse‖ than existing accounts suggest, 
which would leave room for gains from delegating the former to the owner but outsourcing the latter to a 
collective entity.  
72 See Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697, 762 (2010) (discussing the 
need for better ―visual cues‖ for various types of ―rule-bound communities‖). For example, computer-generated 
representations of a home or building‘s property envelope could be incorporated into a GPS-driven application for 
a smartphone for on-site viewing. GPS-enabled applications for smartphones already exist that can display nearby 
properties for sale and three-dimensional renderings of buildings; new ―augmented reality‖ applications could 
layer on additional regulatory information.   
73 Note that alienating one‘s option to make use of, say, one‘s airspace is different from selling the airspace 
itself to someone else, or even transferring rights to affirmatively use it.  Someone might greatly value keeping the 
space around and above her home open, but place little value on using the space herself.  See STUART BANNER, 
WHO OWNS THE SKY?  THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 255 (2008) 
(noting this distinction in the context of airplane overflights); see also Troy A. Rule, Airspace in a Green 
Economy, 59 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782071, draft at 24-25 
(discussing rival and nonrival uses of airspace).  Affirmative and negative easements (or covenants) allow these 
distinctions to be drawn with precision.   
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One way that owners could be induced to communicate something 
about their plans and valuations would be to apply a ―use it or lose it‖ rule. 
But forcing owners to build up and out to the full extent of their property  
packages, on pain of losing their right to do so, encourages wasteful and 
poorly-timed expansions.
74
 If the goal is communication, this is like 
requiring landowners to communicate through gold-plated billboards. That 
the law‘s protection of existing uses provides inducements toward such 
costly communication likely represents a significant source of 
inefficiency.
75
  Another possibility would be to presumptively remove an 
owner‘s rights under specified circumstances of nonuse but permit a clear 
communication to undo that presumption.
76
 This is one way to understand 
the law‘s treatment of easements that arise by operation of law,77 as well as 
adverse possession.
78
  In certain circumstances, these ―speak up or lose out‖ 
rules can avoid stripping higher valuers of entitlements while assigning 
entitlements in the way that will usually maximize value.
79
 But such rules 
must navigate between becoming traps for the unwary (or inertial or 
underlawyered)
80
 and making the opt-out meaningless as a signal of value. 
Simply allowing owners to reserve all manner of rights through a single 
communication would do little or nothing to separate high valuers from low 
valuers.
81
  
What is missing, then, is a less wasteful way for owners to credibly 
communicate their valuations and intentions.
82
 An option-based approach 
that confronts owners with the opportunity costs of holding veto power 
offers one alternative.
83
  Such an approach can serve much the same 
                                                 
74 The analysis here is the same as in other contexts where first-in-time rules produce costly races.  See, e.g., 
Wittman, supra note 49; Nash, supra note 28 (explaining how a first-possession rule for grandfathered rights 
―creates an incentive for societal actors to engage in a race to capture future resource access, on top of the then-
existing race to capture the resource itself‖); David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop, 143 
U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1995) (discussing incentives for ―property owners to accelerate development in order to avoid 
[uncompensated] regulatory losses from future preservation regulation‖).   
75 See Serkin, supra note 20, at 1283-86. 
76 See Sterk, supra note 12, at 96.    
77 See Sterk, supra note 12, at 96 (discussing settings in which the law assumes ―a background duty to 
cooperate that can be limited or shed only if the landowner makes the appropriate communications‖).    
78 One need not actually use one‘s land to avoid losing it to adverse possession; it is sufficient to monitor the 
property and undertake appropriate and timely steps to eject interlopers.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1130 (1985). 
79 For example, Sterk suggests that certain kinds of easements are allowed to arise by operation of law in 
order to avoid bilateral monopoly problems, based on the assumption ―[t]hat the right involved is of little value to 
the nonresponding landowner.‖  Sterk, supra note 12, at 99 n. 150. 
80 Even when opting out is easy, default rules tend to stick.  See, e.g., James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte 
C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick, Passive Decisions and Potent Defaults, in ANALYSES IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
AGING 59 (David A. Wise ed., 2005). Other things equal, the harder it is to learn about and fulfill the opt-out 
conditions, the more likely the default rule will fail to reflect the owners‘ true preferences.    
81 In other words, the opt-out fails as a signal of value when it is no longer ―costly to fake‖ one‘s status as a 
high valuer. See Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason 99-102 (1988).    
82 The problem of determining relative valuations is a very general one that has received a good deal of 
scholarly attention. For a recent survey of several methods for eliciting or inferring valuations, see generally 
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Identifying Intense Preferences, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1391 (2009). 
83 This is the flip side of a permitting approach, which likewise allows a party to choose between cash and an 
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function as turn signals or brake lights by providing reliable information 
about intentions and thereby facilitating coordination.  To appreciate the 
gap that it would fill, however, it is necessary to first consider the extent to 
which traditional land use controls can serve either as substitutes for this 
sort of fine-grained communication, or as communication platforms that 
enable people to ―speak with their feet.‖84   
 
C.  Land Use Controls as Precautions 
 
While law and economics has focused on ex post entitlement choices, 
land use control on the ground has typically employed extensive ex ante 
restrictions implemented through zoning and private covenants.  Although a 
variety of motives drive land use restrictions,
85
 they are at least sometimes 
designed to do exactly what they suggest—prevent conflicts produced by 
incompatible adjacent land uses.
86
  Both public and private land use 
controls forestall conflicts largely by separating uses or privileging 
particular types of uses;
87
 the ex ante regulatory regimes that such controls 
establish can influence both behavioral and locational choices.
88
  It might 
seem that these controls reshape property entitlements in precisely the 
precautionary manner that I am proposing.  Private covenants might seem to 
hew especially closely to the model of customized entitlements I am 
advocating, since these instruments (at least on the most optimistic 
interpretation) involve conscious ceding of certain property rights in order 
to achieve a more harmonious coexistence with one‘s neighbors.  But there 
are some important differences that are best illustrated by starting with an 
examination of what traditional land use controls do best.   
If we were certain that a given type of land use conflict would always be 
most efficiently resolved by granting nonowners control over a particular 
element of the ownership bundle, then zoning or other forms of collective 
                                                                                                                            
option to develop the property in a particular way.  See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species:  A New 
Direction for Habitat Trading Programs, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 1, 11 (2007) (―A permit system allows the 
owner to retain a permit and thus retain value even if the owner does not develop immediately in order to 
maximize economic efficiency.‖).     
84 The idea that citizens ―vote with their feet‖ by selecting among local governments is associated with 
Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLIT. ECON. 416 (1956). 
85 See, e.g., William T. Bogart, “What Big Teeth You Have!”: Identifying the Motivations for Exclusionary 
Zoning, 30 URBAN STUD. 1669 (1993). 
86 See. e.g., Innes, supra note 49, at 288 (describing difficulties in determining efficient initial locations and 
observing that ―[t]his inherent problem with ex-post liability/property rules may motivate the use of zoning 
powers to regulate ex-ante location decisions.‖). 
87 Cumulative (―Euclidian‖) zoning does not actually keep incompatible uses apart so much as it insulates 
less intensive uses from more intensive uses; the less intensive uses can still locate in more intensive zones. See 
ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 29, at 90-91 (describing how cumulative zoning works). 
88 See, e.g., FENNELL, supra note 42, at 123-26 (discussing ―membership effects‖ and ―compliance effects‖); 
Michael J. Pogodzinski & Tim R. Sass, The Economic Theory of Zoning: A Critical Review, 66 LAND ECON. 294, 
295 (1990) (distinguishing ―direct‖ effects of land use controls from effects on mobility).   
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regulation could easily accomplish that result on a wholesale basis.
89
 An 
owner‘s block of property could simply be trimmed back along any number 
of dimensions, excising those entitlements that are presumptively more 
highly valued by someone else. For example, the law‘s decree that 
landowners cannot exclude ordinary aircraft overflights can be 
characterized as having truncated the column of airspace that owners were 
previously thought to have under the ad coelum doctrine.
90
  Similar 
considerations can explain doctrines and legislation involving ―spite fences‖ 
and other instances of gratuitously inflicted harm. Here the trimming takes 
place along a conceptual line defined by motivations rather than a spatial 
dimension, but the curtailment is likewise premised on a judgment that the 
owner‘s interests (here, in spiting her neighbor) are decisively outweighed 
by the neighbor‘s interest in avoiding a spiteful harm.91   
Blanket prohibitions work less well when society is not confident in its 
assessment that one conflicting use is (or, for normative reasons should be 
treated as) invariably the lower-valued one.  It is important not to overstate 
this point.  First, some generalizing may be in order to conserve on the 
administrative costs of running a land use system.  Moreover, mechanisms 
might be layered onto blanket land use controls to selectively undo certain 
restrictions by facilitating bargaining or emulating its results.
92
 Even if such 
mechanisms fail to develop in ways that provide appropriate tailoring, 
across-the-board prohibitions that are highly localized present fewer 
concerns, if multiple regulatory regimes within the same general area exist 
in sufficient variety to permit sorting.
93
 Choosing among an array of 
communities in which private ownership rights have been whittled away in 
various combinations allows for customizing one‘s own entitlement to 
remove the less-valued components, in exchange for gaining control over 
the less-valued components of other owners.
94
 Yet even if sorting operated 
                                                 
89 Felix Frankfurter described legislative lawmaking as ―wholesale‖ and judicial as ―retail.‖  Joseph P. Lash, 
A Brahmin of the Law, in FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1974).  The option exchange described 
here offers an institutional alternative that permits ―retail‖ adjustments without judicial involvement.   
90 For a comprehensive account of how the law regarding overflights developed, see BANNER, supra note  
73. In fact, the geometric shape that fits with a strict interpretation of the ad coelum doctrine is not a column but 
rather a wedge or cone, given the curvature of the earth.  See id. at 17 (―If a man owned what looked like a 
circular parcel of land, one American lawyers‘ magazine explained in the 1860s, his true holding was shaped like 
a cone, with its apex at the center of the earth and its base at some undefined height.‖).   
91 The spiter may, in fact, derive great utility from her aesthetic outburst, but society makes a judgment that 
enjoyment of harm caused to others does not count when determining which of two competing valuations society 
will privilege. See also infra Part III.B.3 (discussing spite fences in the context of abuse of right).   
92 An alternative approach suggested by Michelle White and Donald Wittman is ―zoning-based liability 
rules‖ under which ―[p]olluters are allowed to locate in any zone‖ but ―they are strictly liable for damages when 
located in the wrong zone, while liability is based on negligence when they are in the right zone.‖  Michelle J. 
White & Donald Wittman, Optimal Spatial Location Under Pollution: Liability Rules and Zoning, 10 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 249, 266 (1981).  
93 See Tiebout, supra note 84. In addition to multiple jurisdictions within metropolitan areas, common 
interest communities continue to proliferate, offering ever-expanding opportunities for like-minded households to 
group up and fine-tune their property bundles to suit their fancy.  
94 Of course, people can‘t always find an ideal community featuring precisely the mix of entitlements that 
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well to address heterogeneous valuations (and there is reason to think it may 
not)
95
 traditional land use controls may still fall short in two ways.   
First, land use controls do not provide a mechanism for landowners to 
transact over future flexibility, before it is needed.  Although controls 
operate prospectively, they move entitlements around in real time instead of 
transferring options to later rearrange entitlements. Even when the more 
distant future is expressly contemplated, land use controls typically make 
later transactions harder rather than easier—perpetual conservation 
easements are a prime example.
96
  This omission may not seem especially 
glaring or important at first; transacting over future flexibility sounds rather 
esoteric and alien.  But that is only because property arrives in pre-formed 
standardized blocks that mask the embedded, low-valued inflexibility that 
owners tend to unreflectively consume.
97
 We ordinarily defer purchasing 
things that we do not yet need, and public policy has routinely pushed back 
against attempts to monopolize a supply, such as water, that exceeds one‘s 
usage.
98
  Why, then, would we configure property in land to encourage the 
opposite approach, by making it difficult for owners to do anything other 
than hold monopoly power over low-valued elements or transfer the interest 
outright?   
Second, traditional land use controls offer ―customization‖ of a fairly 
lumpy, off-the-rack variety that applies across an entire neighborhood or 
zone.  The problem is not just that the restrictions may be ill-fitting for 
certain individuals (although this may certainly be the case); it is that the 
system as a whole assumes that identical restrictions among neighbors are 
complements rather than substitutes.  Another way of putting the point is to 
observe that collectively applied land use controls demand that payment for 
another landowner‘s land use concessions be made in kind through 
reciprocal concessions of one‘s own land use rights.  While this may be 
efficient in a given case, there is reason to suppose that some land use 
conflicts are best resolved through different restrictions that apply on 
different parcels within an area.  New forms of renewable energy are just 
one case in point: across-the-board tree restrictions would allow solar power 
                                                                                                                            
they most prefer, but perhaps they can do well enough. See, e.g., FRED FOLDVARY, PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE 
COMMUNITIES 71 (1994).    
95 In earlier work I have considered the shortfalls of sorting, as well as some ways that mechanisms for fine-
tuning land use controls might address valuation heterogeneity.  See FENNELL, supra note 42, at 35-38, 67-119.   
96 For a critique, see Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 
VA. L. REV. 739 (2002).   
97 The metaphorical representation of property as a solid cube corresponding to a square of land may 
contribute to this difficulty.  See Jeanne Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed 
“Property,” 69 TEMPLE L. REV. 1281, 1339-41 (1996) (proposing the alternative metaphor of liquid to represent 
property); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351 (1996) 
(considering how our understanding of property might change if its ―central symbol‖ were water rather than land). 
98 See, e.g., Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in 
Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919 (1998); Sandra Zellmer, The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and Its 
Implications for Collaborative Water Management, 8 NEV. L.J. 994 (2008). 
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to thrive, but communities might be more pleasant if they incorporated a 
workable mix of shade trees and solar power collectors.   
Importantly, the entitlement concessions I discuss here need not 
represent additional incursions layered on top of traditional land use 
controls.  Instead, a voluntary system for the advance concession of veto 
rights could make it feasible for owners to retain larger sets of entitlements 
until a competing use arises, while yet avoiding the fallout from outright 
conflict.  Just as cars in adjacent lanes need not be strictly separated with 
concrete dividers if they can find ways to change lanes without hitting each 
other, so too might categorical prohibitory land use controls become less 
necessary if other ways of avoiding conflicts were popularized.  Notice also 
that enabling landowners to effectively return flexibility to the common 
pool by ceding veto rights has very different effects on the inertia levels of 
the overall property system than does an outright restriction on uses. Where 
traditional land use controls ossify, advance concessions of flexibility do the 
opposite.   
 
II.  PUTTING PRECAUTION INTO PROPERTY 
 
As the discussion above has emphasized, property‘s blocky, inflexible 
nature contributes to costly conflicts among land uses.  It also heightens the 
need to resort to coercive government actions. This Part examines 
mechanisms for injecting greater flexibility into property rights over time, 
with special attention to the potential use of a local land use option 
exchange.
99
  Such an exchange could lower the costs of land use bargains 
between landowners by inducing the precautionary concession of veto 
rights over property entitlements.  Subpart A illustrates the basic workings 
of an option exchange using the example introduced at the beginning of the 
paper: a conflict between a neighbor who wishes to grow tall trees and a 
neighbor who wishes to use solar panels.  Subpart B examines several ways 
the idea could be extended and elaborated to address different factual 
conditions, including the need to assemble a number of spatially proximate 
entitlements.  Subpart C considers two refinements that might affect the 
feasibility and palatability of the family of approaches discussed here: a 
deposit-refund feature, and self-assessed valuation. 
 
                                                 
99 The idea is similar in concept to a bank, but I use the term exchange to emphasize that those making 
deposits and those making withdrawals are often not the same people. The exchange term also helps to distinguish 
the ideas here from other conceptually related but distinct institutional alternatives. See, e.g., MITIGATION 
BANKING: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Lindell L. Marsh et al., eds. 1996) (edited volume addressing public and 
private banking arrangements to accomplish mitigation of harms to wetlands and other habitats); JAMES S. 
COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 267-69 (1994) (describing an ―action-rights bank‖ into which  
people would deposit the right to control a given action, and which would issue shares that could be purchased to 
determine the outcome).   
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A.  A Simple Example: Optioning Sunlight 
 
To see how a precautionary concession of veto rights might work, it is 
helpful to start with a simple and concrete example: two neighbors‘ 
incompatible plans for a solar corridor. 
 
1. Solar Access Versus the Mighty Sequoia 
 
Suppose two neighboring households, the Treetons and the Solshines, 
find themselves clashing over solar access.
100
 The Treetons planted a row of 
young sequoia trees ten years ago.  A few years later, the Solshines moved 
in next door and promptly installed large solar panels along their roof, 
which they use to provide power to their home.  At that time, the Treetons‘ 
sequoias were not tall enough to interfere with the Solshines‘ solar 
collection.  However, the trees have since doubled in height and have begun 
to reduce the effectiveness of the Solshines‘ solar panels. Moreover, unless 
something is done about the trees, they will keep on growing (their height at 
maturity may exceed 200 feet) creating ever-greater interference with the 
Solshines‘ sunny plans.  The conflict is an interesting one, not least because 
it pits two environmentally favored uses against each other.
101
 
There are two obvious ways to avoid this conflict, each of which carries 
a serious disadvantage. First, one use could be privileged over the other, at 
least within a particular geographic scope.  Trees or other structures over a 
certain height might simply be banned, or, alternatively, solar power 
collectors might be either outlawed or permitted solely at the user‘s risk, 
with no recourse for blockages.  Such a solution‘s efficiency depends on 
planners getting things right, so that each use trumps where, and only 
where, it is more valuable than the competing use.  Yet even the most 
benevolent planners are likely to lack information, and even if they have all 
currently available information, they will be uncertain about how things will 
play out in the future. A second possibility is to simply make property rights 
(here, the rights over the airspace through which sunbeams would travel) 
very clear and let parties bargain over them. But, as already discussed, the 
transaction costs associated with this possibility are likely to be prohibitive.  
Even if the Treetons and the Solshines are the only people involved and 
already live next door to each other, they are locked in a bilateral monopoly.  
Deciding where to locate based on the unknown plans of multiple other 
parties is even more daunting.  
It is unsurprising that legal scholars have gravitated toward liability 
                                                 
100 Although I focus on solar access, the same analysis would apply if a view were at stake.  Additional types 
of conflicts are considered infra in Part II.C. 
101 See, e,.g,  Barringer, supra note 21 (calling the conflict an ―eco-parable‖ with ―environmental virtue‖ on 
both sides of the fence). 
1-Jun-11] PROPERTY AND PRECAUTION 22 
rules in an effort to avoid the twin risks of inflexibility and high transaction 
costs.
102
  Yet ordinary liability rules present difficulties of their own due to 
the unilateral nature of the transactions they facilitate. In their standard ―call 
option‖ incarnation, a liability rule permits one party to force another to 
sell. A ―put option‖ conversely allows one party to force the other to 
purchase.  Although a put option involves an equally involuntary imposition 
on the buyer as the call option places on the seller, the normative cast 
changes if we put a governmental entity into the role of forced purchaser.
103
  
While stand-alone governmental put options are certainly possible,
104
 a 
governmental put could be an especially valuable component in an option 
exchange that pairs temporally offset sellers and buyers.  Such an exchange 
could facilitate transactions that are both entirely voluntary and yet free of 
the bilateral monopoly dynamic that often afflicts deals between neighbors.  
The next section explains.   
 
2. An Option Exchange for Solar Easements 
  
Suppose the fictitious city of Hedgerow is aware that some of its 
residents (Type 1) might like to plant tall trees or erect large, permanent 
structures, while others (Type 2) might wish to engage in uses that depend 
on certain of their neighbors not installing any such foliage or fixtures.
105
  
Each Type contains both those who place a high value on their plans (Types 
1H and 2H) and those who place a low value on those plans (Types 1L and 
2L).  Because the Hedgerowians are an uncommunicative lot, none of them 
                                                 
102 See Rule, supra note 21, at 883-92; Bronin, supra note 23, at 910-14. 
103 As Smith discusses, we do not generally see in rem put options that obligate the public at large to buy 
entitlements.  Smith, supra note 53, at 1794-95.  While there are some narrow instances in which people can be 
made to pay for unrequested benefits, these are strictly limited.  See, e.g., Smith at 1795; Ariel Porat, Private 
Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2009) (critiquing current 
narrow scope of liability for such unrequested benefits). To be sure, a put option written by the government 
collectively obligates the populace to engage in the forced purchase; however, the coercion involved is that 
ordinarily attending taxation and subject to a different set of political controls than one-on-one forced purchases 
would be.   
104 The ―Cash for Clunkers‖ program operated by the government in the summer of 2009 offers a recent and 
much-critiqued example of a governmental put; motorists could force the government to purchase (for 
destruction) specified fuel-inefficient vehicles for a credit against certain new vehicle purchases. See Atif R. Mian 
& Amir Sufi, The Effects of Fiscal Stimulus: Evidence from the 2009 “Cash for Clunkers” Program (September 
2010)  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670759 (studying the impact of the program). For some other examples, see 
Morris, supra note 43, at 854–55 (discussing gun buybacks as puts); John Quiggin, Repurchase of Renewal 
Rights: A Policy Option for the National Water Initiative, 50 AUSTRALIAN J. OF AGRICULTURE AND RESOURCE 
ECON. 425 (2006) (examining potential for repurchase of certain renewal rights for irrigation licenses); Michael C. 
Blumm & Joshua D. Smith, Protecting the Columbia River Gorge: A Twenty-Year Experiment in Land-Use 
Federalism, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 201 (2006) (examining the ―opt-out‖ provision for Special Management 
Areas, which involved a variation on a put option: during a limited period, landowners subject to SMA regulation 
could force the government to either purchase the land at fair market value or release them from the regulations). 
105 Assume for purposes of this simple example that the groups are disjoint. Also, my focus is only on the 
conflict over solar access, and not on any aesthetic objections that neighbors may have to solar collectors (or, for 
that matter, trees). In fact, aesthetic objections to solar power do sometimes lead to prohibitions. See Troy Rule, 
Renewable Energy and the Neighbors, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) draft available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1649090, at 19. 
1-Jun-11] PROPERTY AND PRECAUTION 23 
is aware of the Type to which any other household belongs, nor does the 
city of Hedgerow have this information.  However, Hedgerow knows that 
Types 1H and 2H place a value of $5,000 on being able to carry out their 
plans, while Types 1L and 2L place a value of only $500 on the chance to 
pursue their rather inchoate intentions.   
Hoping to minimize conflict, Hedgerow initially considers offering a 
deal to its residents whereby it agrees to buy any household‘s ―build up‖ 
rights at a price of, say, $600.  Note that transferring these ―build up‖ rights 
equates to granting a negative easement for light and air (hereinafter, a 
―solar easement‖). Alienating a solar easement imposes on the original 
owner the duty to keep the airspace clear, but it does not in any way 
compromise that original owner‘s ability to keep others from entering the 
airspace in question.  By offering such a put option, Hedgerow can collect 
solar easements from the Type 1Ls and from all the Type 2s.  It can then 
post a map that shows which households have surrendered these easements 
and offer them for sale to 2Hs, whose valuable plans depend on keeping the 
airspace clear.  Such purchases may not always be possible (some 2Hs will 
be surrounded by 1Hs who will not have sold their options), but they may 
often be so. More important, 2H‘s who are considering locating in the  
neighborhood can examine the map to see which locations would enable 
them to acquire the easements necessary to carry out their desired plans.   
A major drawback to this approach is that it is very expensive for 
Hedgerow to actually buy up all these solar easements and warehouse them 
until it can resell them (a time that might never arrive).  Fortunately, as 
Hedgerow soon realizes, it does not actually have to buy the easements 
themselves in order to reduce future conflicts over solar power use; it can 
instead buy options to buy the easements. Just as financial futures and 
options show us that flexibility over time can be extended to third parties 
without actually alienating the underlying asset,
106
 so too can control over 
land use rights be alienated separately from the underlying rights 
themselves.
107
 All that is necessary to break up a later monopoly deadlock is 
a unilateral right to purchase.  A call option grants the holder the right, but 
not the obligation, to acquire the underlying asset (here, the solar easement).   
Thus Hedgerow can acquire call options on solar easements that it will 
hold for later resale by making a ―flexibility payment‖ that represents only 
the option premium, not the value of the underlying easement itself.
108
 
                                                 
106 For an accessible introduction, see Lester G. Tesler, Futures and Actual Markets: How They Are Related, 
59(2.2) J. BUS. S5 (1986).   
107 This line of analysis follows literature that casts property ownership as a set of ―real options,‖ including 
the option to continue possession and use, to develop, or to redevelop for another use.  See, e.g., Laura Quigg, 
Optimal Land Development, in REAL OPTIONS IN CAPITAL INVESTMENT: MODELS, STRATEGIES, AND 
APPLICATIONS 265 (Lenos Trigeorgis ed., 1995). Once these options are identified as separate repositories of 
value, the possibility emerges that control over them might be alienated to third parties.    
108 More precisely, Hedgerow would give residents a put option that would enable those residents to force a 
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Suppose a Type 1L landowner, Wunnell, takes Hedgerow‘s offer, and, in 
exchange for a small lump of cash, alienates a call option on her solar 
easement.  All Wunnell has transferred is a call option granting the holder 
the right (but not the obligation) to engage in a later transaction to buy the 
easement at the going strike price (more on that shortly). Wunnell continues 
to hold ―build-up‖ rights109 until such time as someone—the city or a later 
buyer—exercises the call option and actually acquires the solar easement.  
However, any building-up that Wunnell does will be at her own risk (or 
pursuant to private insurance arrangements); if the call option is later 
exercised, Wunnell will be duty-bound to clear the solar path and keep it 
unobstructed.  Alternatively, Wunnell can undo the deal by repurchasing the 
option before its exercise, subject to certain limits.
110
 
Using the option format requires establishing not only an option price 
(the amount the government pays to acquire an option on Wunnell‘s solar 
easement) but also a strike price (the amount that a household purchasing a 
solar easement option would have to pay to acquire the easement itself).  
Pricing constitutes one of the most challenging aspects of this approach, and 
I will take it up in some detail in subpart B, below.  For now, it is sufficient 
to suggest that some algorithm would be established for determining the 
―going rate‖ in a given area at regular intervals, and that this rate would 
determine the option‘s strike price.111 A Type 2H owner (call him 
Tooaytch), would first acquire the solar easement option on Wunnell‘s 
property from the local government‘s option exchange. This would give  
Tooaytch the right, but not the obligation, to pay the current strike price 
(within some limited exercise period) and thereby acquire Wunnell‘s solar 
easement.
112
     
Although there are a number of moving parts, the core idea is very 
simple: providing an institutional platform that allows households to 
voluntarily downgrade certain property entitlements (ones that  they do not 
value very highly) from property rule protection to liability rule protection.  
In other words, owners are presented with the opportunity cost of holding 
veto power over entitlements, and thereby encouraged to delink the veto 
power for low-valued entitlements from the entitlements themselves.  
Figure 1 summarizes the structure of the situation as it unfolds over time for 
the various players, using the example outlined above.
113
 
                                                                                                                            
sale of a call option on their solar easements.  For discussion of pricing, see infra Part II.B.2. 
109 While Wunnell still owns the legal interest (even with a call option on it outstanding), it is technically not 
(yet) an easement.  See, e.g., Van Sandt v. Royster, 83 P.2d 698, 700 (Kansas 1938) (stating the rule that one 
cannot own an easement on one‘s own land).   
110 See infra Part II.B.3. 
111 See Kades, supra note 6, at 1255-56 (discussing ―floating options‖).   
112 Option sales and resales would need to be limited in ways that would avoid creating new monopoly 
problems, whether through eligibility requirements that would constrain the pool of purchasers, or through 
alienability limits that would accomplish the same result indirectly.  See text accompanying notes 156-158, infra.   
113 For completeness, I have included Types 2L and 1H in the chart, even though they are not directly 
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Figure 1:  
Hedgerow’s Option Exchange in Action (An Example) 
 
          Time 
Player 
 Time 0  Time 1 Time 2 
City of 
Hedgerow 
Offers a deal  
(put option):   
 
We‘ll pay $$ for a 
call option on a 
solar easement 
across your land. 
Sells call option 
acquired from 1L to 
2H.  The strike price is 
set at the then-going 
rate, and the exercise 
period is limited.   
When 2H exercises 
the call option, serves 
as an intermediary in 
transferring the 
easement and 
forwarding payment. 
Type 1H 
(High 
Valuer of 
Build-Up 
Rights) 
 
Refuses deal; 
retains full 
property rule 
control
114
 over 
rights to plant and 
build. 
Plants trees to her 
heart‘s content.  
Enjoys trees, avoids 
stressful interactions 
with solar-power 
enthusiasts. 
Wunnell 
[Type 1L] 
(Low  
Valuer of 
Build-Up 
Rights) 
 
Takes deal. Plants or builds at her 
own risk (or pursuant 
to private insurance 
arrangements).    
When call option for 
solar easement is 
exercised by 2H, 
receives the strike 
price and loses the 
easement.   
Tooaytch 
[Type 2H] 
(High 
Valuer of 
Solar 
Access) 
Takes deal.   Searches Hedgerow‘s 
solar easement call 
option exchange, 
locates a clear solar 
path across 1L‘s land, 
and buys the option. 
Buys and exercises 
the solar easement 
call option Hedgerow 
acquired from 1L.  
Installs massive solar 
panels; enjoys solar 
power free of 
interference. 
Type 2L 
(Low 
Valuer of 
Solar 
Access) 
 
 
Takes deal. Has no desire to build 
and is not currently 
motivated to seek a 
solar easement; just 
enjoys the extra cash.   
Admires neighbor‘s 
solar panels.  May 
become a 2H in time. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
involved in the primary transaction examined in this example.   
114 This property rule control is not absolute, as property remains subject to the risk of later regulatory 
change, as well as to the possibility of eminent domain.   See text accompanying notes 166-168.   
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3. Why Do It That Way?   
 
This example, simplified as it is, might already seem unduly complex.  
Because any model of precaution must pay attention to administrative costs 
as well as accident costs and prevention costs, it is worth asking whether an 
option exchange‘s unfamiliar and somewhat elaborate structure adds 
anything useful to garden variety liability rules.
115
  It might seem easier, for 
example, for Hedgerow to simply declare that no tall trees or buildings are 
allowed and let the serious tree lovers (Type 1Hs) buy their way out of that 
restriction.
116
  As a response to a static situation in which the neighbors are 
already in place and their preferences are fixed, such a ―pay to build‖ 
regime looks appealing. Recognizing the conflict as one that unfolds over 
time, however,  shows how the option exchange arrangement just described 
might dominate.   
Suppose that in 2000 nearly all households are would-be builders or 
tree-growers (Type 1s).  However, most of them are Type 1Ls with only a 
vague sense that they might someday wish to use their airspace. Slapping a 
―no building up‖ rule on the population at this stage is hardly a politically 
popular move, nor does it seem particularly necessary.  The ―pay to build‖ 
provision, far from mitigating opposition to the rule change, would 
probably be viewed as yet another attempt on the part of local government 
to ―mint‖ its own money.117 Even putting political feasibility aside, 
however, consider how a ―pay to build‖ scheme would operate over time as 
more solar-power enthusiasts (Type 2s) enter the population and 
preferences among both Type 1s and Type 2s grow more intense. Type 2s 
would immediately see that ―pay to build‖ undermines their ability to move 
forward with their plans with any confidence. After Tooaytch makes a large 
investment in solar power, for example, a neighboring family might 
suddenly buy build-up rights.   
There are a few ways to address this concern, but each introduces 
difficulties. One possibility is to channel the money collected from the ―pay 
to build‖ buyout to any Type 2s whose plans are disrupted as a result.  This 
will predictably cause Type 2s to pay little attention to avoiding conflict, 
and, indeed, some Type 2Ls might even find it profitable to court conflict in 
the hope of getting a payout in excess of their own valuations.  The moral 
                                                 
115 See text accompanying note 23, supra.   
116 Alternatively, Hedgerow could start with a default rule of no right to solar access, but let solar enthusiasts 
(Type 2Hs) obtain easements and enjoin blockages thereof for a fee.  See Rule, supra note 21, at 891-92 
(describing Iowa‘s solar access regime, which adopts roughly this approach).  This, too, would be a garden variety 
liability rule, although one corresponding to the rarer ―Rule 4‖ subspecies in Calabresi and Melamed‘s 
framework. See id. at  860 fig. A, 891-92.   
117 Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules For an Old Game? Comments On the Municipal Art 
Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 3 (1991). 
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hazard problem could be limited by making compensation invariant to the 
Type 2s actual investments,
118
 but an invariant payment gives Type 1Hs no 
incentive to identify themselves promptly, before costly investments are 
made.
119
  Another possibility is to impose a sunset on the ―pay to build‖ 
option, either by making it available only during a limited time frame or by 
cutting it off whenever a neighbor begins engaging in a conflicting use.  But 
the former is ill-suited to changes over time that might cause new 1Hs to 
emerge, while the latter would encourage the kinds of wasteful 
communication discussed earlier, as owners race to truncate the rights of 
their neighbors.   
Why does the option exchange described above perform better?  
Certainly we can say it would be more politically palatable simply because 
money is initially flowing in a different direction—towards those who 
voluntarily surrender their rights rather than away from those who want to 
retain their rights.  But that is hardly a reasoned basis for preferring the put 
option structure; indeed, as we will see, the upfront cost involved presents 
an important obstacle to be overcome.  The real advantage of the option 
exchange lies in its ability to distinguish between two sets of people who 
are observationally equivalent under the ―pay to build‖ alternative:  those 
who do not value the build-up right in excess of the price set for it, and 
those who do value the build-up right in excess of the fee but, for various 
reasons, prefer to wait before exercising it.  Some of the tactics discussed 
above (sunsets, estoppel) do offer ways to shrink the second group, but at 
significant cost.    
Now compare the option exchange. Here, Hedgerow starts by extending 
a put option: offering to buy up call options on solar easements.  While it is 
true that we cannot tell whether those who have not yet exercised this initial 
put option will do so at some point in the future, this is less of a problem in 
terms of coordinating uses going forward.  Recall, exercising the put option 
means relinquishing part of one‘s property package (the veto over alienation 
of build-up rights), not augmenting the package.  Thus, while more people 
may exercise the put option in the future, that will only reduce the prospect 
of conflict, not heighten it.  Those who have already exercised their put 
options have alienated along with it unlimited freedom to change their 
minds. Certainly we can structure the option exchange system to permit 
landowners who have alienated a call option on a solar easement across 
                                                 
118 Cf. Cooter, supra note 4, at 14-15 (explaining how liquidated damages, which are invariant to actual 
harm, maintain incentives for the nonbreaching party in contract).   
119 The payment and compensation components could be decoupled, charging 1s based on actual costs to 2s, 
but giving 2s only the invariant lump.  Cf. Plassmann & Tideman,  supra note 31 (proposing a similarly decoupled 
approach – one in which the invariant lump is based on a self-assessed value – to align incentives in the eminent 
domain context).  But if the objection to the option exchange arrangement is its complexity, this would not 
necessarily represent a simplification.  It would also presumably be politically difficult to deny full compensation 
to harmed 2s when the government is collecting it from 1s.   
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their land to buy back that option before it is exercised by a third party.
120
  
But a third party contemplating buying an option would know that once she 
does so, she can complete a unilateral purchase of the underlying 
entitlement during the exercise period.  This is different from the estoppel 
provision contemplated above in that the third party buying the entitlement 
(here, a Type 2 who wishes to engage in solar collection) need not engage 
in the use itself in order to extinguish the conflicting claim of the other 
party.  Rather, she need only buy an option on the underlying entitlement, 
which has been voluntarily placed in a pool for purchase.
121
   
There are other advantages to the specific option exchange format 
contemplated here
122
 that might hold significance in specific contexts or 
under particular evaluative frameworks.  By making the default rule one in 
which the landowner retains a given right, claims of involuntary 
confiscation of property, and associated intrusions on autonomy, are 
minimized.  It is true that the system effectively imposes a fee on those who 
hold onto all their rights,
123
 but this kind of interference with monetary 
value is typically viewed as standing on a different footing from a direct 
interference with the prerogatives of ownership.
124
 The option exchange 
thus interjects flexibility into a property system without requiring more 
regulation while at the same time avoiding the political pushback that might 
accompany the explicit sale of zoning rights.  A ―pay to build‖ alternative 
                                                 
120 Part II.B.3,  infra, discusses how buyback transactions might be handled, as well as limits that might be 
imposed to avoid strategic buybacks.   
121 Again, we could add features to the ―pay to build‖ option that would cut off the chance to exercise the 
option upon sufficient payments from a third party interested in exercising inconsistent rights.  But to create the 
structure for managing these payments would require an institutional platform no less complex than the option 
exchange itself.   
122 The discussion above presented only one of many possible ways of structuring an institutional platform 
for pairing buyers and sellers of options. Calabresi and Melamed‘s work and the large body of literature building 
on it emphasize that there is always a flip side of any arrangement, a Rule 4 for every Rule 2, a call for every put.  
See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3; Ayres, supra note 32; see also Saul Levmore, Carrots and Torts, in 
CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 203 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).  Options might also be nested, 
sequenced, decoupled, and combined in any number of ways.  See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 42. Although 
space does not permit cataloguing how all these alternatives might be incorporated into an option exchange 
format, one differently structured alternative is discussed below in Part II.C.2 (describing how parties might 
voluntarily alienate options of the ―pay me to stand it‖ variety).  Optioning one‘s power to engage in an 
affirmative use, as in the solar easement example presented here, produces a voluntary Rule 4 regime (in which a 
third party can pay to stop a use), while optioning the power to stop someone else‘s use creates a Rule 2 regime 
(in which a third party would pay to continue the use).  See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3; Rule, supra note 
21, at 891-92.  I thank Ariel Porat for conversations on these points. 
123 Even though framed as a put option that pays a subsidy for relinquishing rights,  the system amounts to a 
tax on those who fail to relinquish rights, assuming that the subsidies would be funded by property owners 
generally.  For more on funding alternatives, see Part II.B.1,  infra.   
124 Amnon Lehavi, The Taking/Taxing Taxonomy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2010) (emphasizing the 
law‘s differential treatment of governmental acts that reduce value and those that interfere with exclusion or other 
core property rights); Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council,  26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 955, 957-59 (1993) (criticizing this distinction in takings law); 
see also Armen A. Alchian, Property Rights, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. 
Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume, eds.) (2d. ed. 2008) online at  
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_P000226 (―It is important to note that it is the 
physical use and condition of a good that are protected from the action of others [by private property rights], not 
its exchange value.‖). 
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would combine these two elements by adding alienable regulations. As a 
result, it could be expected to elicit opposition both from property rights 
advocates and from those opposed to allowing people to buy their way out 
of land use restrictions.
125
   
 
B.  Money and Uncertainty 
 
Despite its attractive features, an option exchange must confront a 
number of foundational problems involving the movement of cash among 
the players over time and under conditions of uncertainty.  First, writing put 
options for the populace—even if what the governmental entity offers to 
buy is itself only an option—requires some source of funding.  Second is 
the knotty issue of setting prices.
126
  Third are a set of issues involving how, 
when, and at what price resales or reversals of the original transaction can 
be accomplished. Without purporting to provide a detailed operational 
blueprint, the sections below take up these questions.   
 
1. Deposit-Refund Systems   
 
The option premiums (―flexibility payments‖) offered to households 
who surrender veto power could be funded in a variety of ways, each with 
particular distributive and incentive effects.  The challenge is to devise a 
funding approach that is consistent with the overall goal of minimizing total 
accident costs.  Here it is helpful to revisit the idea that property ownership 
draws against a stock of spatial and temporal flexibility  by granting owners 
a set of veto rights. Deposit-refund systems, of which bottle bills are a 
familiar example, suggest an interesting possibility:
127
 owners might be 
charged a ―flexibility tax‖ that could then be rebated in part as portions of 
the property bundle are optioned.
128
   
                                                 
125 Cf.  Wallace E. Oates, From Research to Policy: The Case of Environmental Economics, 2000 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 135 (2000) (recounting how opposition to market-oriented pollution controls came both from those who 
believed entitlements to emit should not be sold and from those who resisted additional restrictions on their 
activities); Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO2:  Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 
109-10 (2008) (observing that ―the history of American water institutions suggests that cap-and-trade regimes are 
likely to be subject to moral objections from two almost diametrically opposed sources: a pro-development 
argument that any resource cap is immoral so long as there are still mouths to be fed; and a pro-environmental 
charge that it is immoral to trade away one‘s bad actions‖).   
126 This issue is not unique to the option exchange format, however; even a simple ―pay to build‖ regime 
would require setting a price for exceeding the specified height.     
127 Independent work by Robert M. Solow and Edwin S. Mills laid the intellectual foundations for this 
approach. See Robert M. Solow, The Economist‟s Approach to Pollution and Its Control, 173 SCIENCE n.s. 498 
(Aug. 6, 1971); EDWIN S. MILLS, URBAN ECONOMICS 259-60 (1972); see also PETER BOHM, DEPOSIT-REFUND 
SYSTEMS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL, CONSERVATION, AND CONSUMER POLICY (1981); 
Don Fullerton & Ann Wolverton, Two Generalizations of A Deposit Refund System, NBER Working Paper No. 
7505 (2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7505. 
128 Although it takes a somewhat different tack, Nicolaus Tideman‘s work relates very closely to the issues I 
discuss here, both in terms of identifying and characterizing problems and in proposing mechanisms for 
addressing them. See Tideman, supra note 26, at 347 (noting imposition on flexibility that immobile 
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Spelling out the analogy to deposit-refund systems will help to illustrate 
some of the advantages of this approach. If it is costly to follow people 
around after they buy a bottled drink to determine whether they dispose of 
the bottle carefully or carelessly (and fine them in the latter case), an initial 
fee or tax equal to the damage that improper bottle disposal would inflict 
can be charged at the time of purchase.
129
  This fee is paired with a later put 
option—the ability to force the sale of the empty bottle back to a designated 
facility at a fixed price.  The surrendered bottle proves that one has not, in 
fact, inflicted the feared damage on society.
130
  The net result of the 
combined deposit and refund is a tax on improper disposal.
131
   
Economists have explored the use of ―environmental bonds‖ or other 
generalizations of the deposit-refund idea to refine incentives over time and 
under conditions of uncertainty.
132
  The idea is the same as in the bottle bill 
context: entities whose acts may inflict harms on society post bonds that 
will later be refundable in whole or in part upon a showing that the feared 
harm has not come to pass.  Instead of presenting an empty bottle as proof 
that harm has not been inflicted, the entity might use other forms of proof to 
establish facts about the state of the world.
133
  Although this way of 
approaching uncertain future impacts has been neglected in the legal 
literature, it could have significant traction in the land use setting. 
Like bottles, landowners‘ entitlements can be disposed of in more or 
                                                                                                                            
improvements present and recommending a tax system to address it); id. at 348  (exploring the possibility of using 
a land rent system to price both positive and negative spatial externalities); id. at 346 (suggesting a bond system to 
cover the costs of later abandonment); id. at 347 (explaining how ―unsubdivided land‖ might be analogized to ―an 
exhaustible natural resource such as oil‖).  In recent work, he and Florenz Plassmann have examined how a bond 
requirement could address uncertainty about the magnitude of externalities.  See T. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz 
Plassmann, Pricing Externalities, 26 EUR. J. POLIT. ECON. 176 (2010). 
129 See Robert Costanza & Charles Perrings, A Flexible Assurance Bonding System for Improved 
Environmental Management, 2 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 57, 59 (1990) . 
130 The system thus switches the burden of proof to the bottle purchaser.  See id. at 59, 65. 
131 See, e.g., Fullerton & Wolverton, supra note 127, at 2 (―This ‗two-part instrument‘ is equivalent to a 
Pigovian tax on the ‗dirty‘ activity‖).  This assumes that there are only two disposal choices, proper and improper.  
In fact, there are better and worse ways of disposing of bottles that are not turned in, and in some cases bottles that 
were not surrendered may have been put to another productive use (for example, as an input to a craft project).  
This overbreadth problem turns out to be less of a concern in the property context. Whereas in the bottle deposit 
context, the physical bottle merely proxies (imperfectly) for not having conducted an improper disposal, the 
surrendered flexibility in the land use context is valuable in itself, and costly (though often cost-justified) when 
retained. 
132 See, e.g., Costanza & Perrings, supra note 129; Charles Perrings, Environmental Bonds and 
Environmental Research in Innovative Activities, 1 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 95 (1989); Ronnie Horesh, Better than 
Kyoto: Climate Stability Bonds, 22(3) ECON. AFFAIRS 48 (2002).  For a recent overview of the literature and some 
variations on the deposit-refund theme, see Angelo Antoci, Environmental Options and Technological Innovation: 
An Evolutionary Game Model, FEEM Working Paper No. 90.2009 (November 2009)  available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1515701.  For a discussion of some difficulties with this approach, see Loredana Torsello 
& Alessandro Vercilli, Environmental Bonds: A Critical Assessment in SUSTAINABILITY: DYNAMICS AND 
UNCERTAINTY (Graciela Chichilnisky et al., eds, 1998).   
133 See, e.g., Costanza & Perrings, supra note 129, at 65-66.  The same idea can be applied to encourage 
social improvements; bonds can be issued that will pay off when particular social goals are met or particular, 
measurable conditions obtain (ones that the bondholders have some capacity to influence).  Ronnie Horesh, 
Injecting Incentives Into the Solution of Social Problems: Social Policy Bonds  20(3) ECON. AFFAIRS (2000)   It is 
even possible to issue bonds that give two different groups or entities different sides of the same bet regarding the 
future state of the world.  See Antoci, supra note 132.  
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less costly ways.  For example, they can be used as a source of monopoly 
leverage or they can be surrendered to a higher valuing user in a low-cost 
bargain.  Examining the situation ex post, we cannot tell whether a 
particular landowner who refuses to sell some element of her holding is 
exercising a blocking power over a low-valued right, or is using her veto 
power as owner to retain a high-valued right.
134
 Providing a mechanism for 
advance surrender of the blocking power can help to differentiate between 
high- and low-valuing owners.  Low-valuing owners would still be free to 
hold onto their veto rights in the hope of later using them strategically, but 
this tendency would be cabined in two ways.  First, they would forgo a 
payment in doing so, which raises the opportunity cost of making that 
choice. Second, the expected return from strategic behavior would be likely 
to drop once it becomes easier for parties to make location decisions that 
take into account the amenability of the neighbors to their planned uses.   
To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is anything morally 
blameworthy or suspect about an owner wanting to retain veto rights over 
portions of her property package for which she has no current or pending 
plans.  My point is only that this retention of rights (like every other 
instance of ownership) amounts to a sustained draw against a limited stock 
of flexibility, and should be priced as such.  The deposit-refund notion is 
helpful in that it can deal relatively well with externalities whose 
magnitudes are unknown. We can be sure that, in the aggregate, large 
quantities of privately held property rights have an inertial effect, but we 
cannot know exactly how or when particular plans will be thwarted.  Taking 
an advance payment
135
 that acknowledges the potential of ownership‘s 
prerogatives to ossify the built environment provides a mechanism for 
selectively providing incentives for flexibility from that same fund as the 
need arises. This approach may strike some readers as insufficiently 
protective of property rights.  In fact, it is likely to be far more protective of 
private property rights if it succeeds in allowing purchased private 
flexibility, surrendered voluntarily, to substitute for across-the-board 
transfers of rights from private parties to collectives.   
 
2. Valuation and Pricing  
 
A full analysis of how land use options might be structured and priced is 
beyond the scope of this essay, but a few observations on valuation and 
pricing are in order.  As a threshold matter, it is important to keep straight 
                                                 
134 In other words, we cannot tell whether someone is acting as a (strategic) holdout or an (honest) ―holdin.‖  
See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry:  Communities and Individuals in Law and 
Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 128–29 (2004). 
135 Given that the externality in this case flows from continuing to hold an owner‘s veto, payment would be 
assessed annually or at other regular intervals.  See infra note 143 and accompanying text.    
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several different moving parts: (a) an initial tax or deposit collected from 
property owners that reflects the potential interference with future flexibility 
of their veto rights; (b) a flexibility premium offered to landowners for the 
sale of call options on certain entitlements (technically, the strike price on a 
put option written by the governmental entity); (c) the price at which other 
landowners can acquire those call options (the option price for the call 
option); and (d) the price at which those other landowners can exercise the 
option to actually acquire the entitlement (the strike price for the call 
option).   
The last element, the strike price at which the entitlement is actually 
transferred, offers a natural starting point for analysis.  Even if particular 
land use entitlements are not frequently bought and sold on the open 
market, it may be possible to develop a measure for valuing these elements 
using a hedonic pricing method.
136
 In particular contexts, other possibilities 
may exist as well.  For example, solar energy produces energy savings that 
are quantifiable, making it possible to tie the strike price for exercising a 
solar easement option to, say, the average energy cost savings achieved by 
all landowners within a given category (such as residential single-family 
households on lots less than one acre).
137
 This figure would change over 
time but could be determined at any given time using an agreed-upon index.  
The original owner in the story would, after selling this option, hold an 
entitlement subject to an index-priced option or ―ESIPO.‖138   
Keying the price to an element relevant to the purchaser‟s valuation 
might seem exactly backwards, since it would mean that transactions could 
occur more easily when the easement becomes less valuable in the 
purchaser‘s hands. But if a fixed lower bound for the strike price were set 
using this same method at the time the option were initially conveyed, we 
could be certain that options would only be ―in the money‖ when the value 
to the purchaser exceeded the price that the seller initially found sufficient.  
Allowing the exercise price to then float upward when (but only when) it 
starts to become more valuable to others would help to overcome what is 
likely to be the largest resistance point to transferring the option: the 
opportunity cost of giving up the chance to later bargain over a larger 
surplus.
139
  
                                                 
136 For discussion of the hedonic market analysis, see, for example, JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 202 (2005).  See also Jonathan Remy Nash, Mark to Ecosystem Service Market: Repricing 
Conservation Easements to Protect Ecosystems, in REBUILDING THE ARK: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ESA REFORM 
(Jonathan H. Adler ed., forthcoming 2011) (discussing alternative valuation methods for conservation easements). 
137 It would also be necessary to select a time horizon over which the energy savings should be calculated, as 
well as decide whether special financing should be made available to purchasers to address liquidity issues.    
138 Cf. Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2179 (1997) (observing that a 
liability rule creates a ―property right subject to an option (or easement)‖ — that is, a ―PRSTO (or PRSTE)‖). 
139 This analysis does not turn on whether the valuation of the original owner is actually correlated with that 
of the easement acquirer, nor on how or whether correlated values relate to the choice between property rules and 
liability rules. For discussion of those issues, see generally Ian Ayres & Paul Goldbart, Correlated Values in the 
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ESIPOs are not the only pricing alternative available, however.  Another 
approach would allow the original owners to set the prices at which options 
could later be exercised—what I have elsewhere termed entitlements 
subject to self-made options, or ―ESSMOs.‖140  ESSMOs offer a great deal 
of flexibility where valuations vary widely and contain significant 
subjective components. Administering them adds a few additional wrinkles, 
however—notably the need to adjust the price of the option itself to reflect 
the selected strike price.   For example, the government would not want to 
pay the same flexibility premium to a household that set a price for its solar 
easement at $1 million as it would to a household that set a price of $100.  
One possibility would be a sliding scale or menu of strike prices for the call 
option (element (d) above) integrated with a corresponding list of flexibility 
premiums (element (b)). 
Consider next factor (a), the initial tax or fee on ownership‘s 
inflexibility. One benchmark might be the ―settlement costs‖ of 
condemnation,
141
 plus the expected costs of preparing the property for a 
new use: the costs of paying compensation for, and then tearing down and 
hauling away, any improvements added to the land that cannot be 
repurposed.
142
  Suitable adjustments could then be made for factors that 
increase the likely need for condemnation, such as especially strategic 
placement, excessively small lot sizes (making reassembly more difficult), 
and so on.
143
  While an owner‘s inflexibility may lead to many outcomes 
other than condemnation, including additional land use regulation that does 
not require payment of just compensation, condemnation remains an 
available last resort that helps to set the outer bounds of the potential 
interference that ownership of the entire property block produces.  The 
point of the fee is not, of course, to pre-fund the expanded use of eminent 
domain, but rather to collect for an externality produced by ownership and, 
by pricing it, reduce the tendency to hang onto the sorts of unnecessary 
rights that make eminent domain (and other coercive interventions) more 
likely.     
                                                                                                                            
Theory of Property and Liability Rules 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (2003) and Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 43. 
Rather, the approach here is driven by the owner‘s opportunity costs of transforming a property rule entitlement 
into an entitlement protected only by a liability rule, where part of the package that attends the former is the 
ability to try to capture a share of any later bargaining surplus. 
140 See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1433-44 (2005) (describing 
ESSMOs and reviewing antecedent literature taking similar approaches).    
141 See Michelman, supra note 39, at 1214-15 (defining ―settlement costs‖ as the ―dollar value of the time, 
effort, and resources which would be required in order to reach compensation settlements adequate to avoid 
demoralization costs‖). The actual fair market value of the property that would be obtained or transferred through 
eminent domain is not part of these settlement costs.   
142 On the advance payment of a destruction fee, see Tideman, supra note 26, at 346.  The destruction fee 
also relates to the abandonment point raised infra, Part II.C.3.  
143 Cf. Tideman, supra note 26, at 347 (proposing an annual tax based on the self-assessed value of  
improvements to account for the social loss of flexibility associated with remaining on a given site). Tideman 
contemplates that such a tax would work in conjunction with a system in which owners pay the rental value of the 
land to the government.  See id. at 342-47.   
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The deposit-refund literature suggests choosing a high estimate of likely 
future damage (here, from inflexibility) where significant uncertainty exists. 
If later information reveals that the initial estimate of damage is too high, 
rebates can be made across the board to property owners.
144
 In this context, 
such a readjustment might be triggered by changes in demand for urban and 
suburban land within a given jurisdiction due to exogenous changes in the 
costs or benefits of physical agglomeration, or by other technological 
changes (such as virtual reality advances) that make the acts of neighbors 
less consequential or the need for redevelopment less pressing. Even in the 
absence of governmental adjustments of initial estimates, insurance 
companies could step in with actuarially determined estimates, paying the 
flexibility tax on behalf of their customers in exchange for a premium and 
the assignment of all later rebates.
145
 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the pricing of the option on, say, the 
solar easement—both when it is initially transferred to the government‘s 
option exchange, and when it is later transferred to a third party (such as a 
neighbor).
146
  The amount the government offers to households that sell a 
call option on an entitlement with strike price (d) amounts to a partial rebate 
on (a) that, like a bottle deposit refund, is based on the owner‘s softening of 
inflexibility.  As such, it should be selectively priced based on the harm that 
a given type of inflexibility is causing. The government then acts as a 
broker or middleman in reselling the call option to other households at price 
(c), which would reflect an administrative increment as well as the 
constrained length of the option period that is extended to third parties.
147
    
Lurking in the background of all this pricing is the fact that the 
adjustments being made through options might also be made, at least in 
many cases, through regulatory action without any compensation at all.  
This presents some complications, but it also helps to provide a relevant 
baseline for evaluating how even very imperfectly priced options might 
perform. However rough and approximate the pricing might be, any 
separation that options achieve between high and low valuing entitlement 
holders will improve precision over an across-the-board regulatory 
approach.   
 
3. Reacquisitions and Resales 
 
                                                 
144 See, e.g., Costanza & Perrings, supra note 129, at 66. 
145 See BOHM, supra note 127, at 86-89. 
146 There could be non-neighbor third party intermediaries who purchase and resell options, although these 
sales would have to be subject to limits on resale that are consistent with the goals of the option exchange.  For 
example, it would do no good to have individual owners surrender their monopoly power only to allow a private 
entity to monopolize an entire community‘s set of options for a given use.   
147 The option could be unlimited in term while yet held by the government, but the option period should be 
strictly limited upon its transfer to a third party.  See text accompanying note 150, infra. 
1-Jun-11] PROPERTY AND PRECAUTION 35 
Using options to extend flexibility to others necessarily means 
restricting one‘s own flexibility.  I have emphasized throughout that the 
future is fraught with uncertainty and that new information unfolds over 
time.  This is true at the individual owner and parcel level, as well as at a 
larger scale.  How, when, and at what price should an owner who 
previously optioned or alienated entitlements, or a new owner of a parcel on 
which entitlements have been optioned or alienated, be able to reclaim 
control over that entitlement?
148
 As Figure 1 suggests, there are at least 
three relevant points in the timeline.  First, there is the initial transfer of a 
call option to the local governmental entity, which we can designate as 
having occurred at Time 0.  Then, at Time 1, the call option is resold to 
another party.  Finally, at Time 2, the option is exercised by the other party.   
Between Time 0 and Time 1, it would be feasible to allow owners to 
buy back their options by repaying the initial flexibility payment along with 
an additional increment to cover administrative costs. But it would be 
advisable to add restrictions to ensure that this buyback alternative is not 
elected strategically (that is, as soon as the original owner gets wind that 
someone may be interested in using the entitlement).  One approach would 
be to make any entitlement for which an option is reacquired inalienable for 
a certain period, or alienable only by re-exercising a put option to return it 
to the government‘s option exchange at the price at which it was originally 
surrendered.
149
   
Between Time 1 and Time 2, the limited option exercise period 
established by the government when the option is transferred to a third 
party, the original owner would be unable to call back the option except by 
negotiating a deal with the option holder.  Keeping the exercise period of 
the option relatively short once it is in the third party‘s hands reduces the 
chance that the option holder will become the lower-valuing user of the 
underlying entitlement in the interim. If that were to happen, the original 
owner could still attempt to buy back the option from the option holder 
before it is exercised,
150
 but the option holder could refuse to sell in an 
effort to extract more surplus from the original owner.
 151
  In other words, 
the call option would itself be protected by a property rule, and as such 
                                                 
148 The possibility of multiple rounds of liability rule takings has been viewed as a conceptual difficulty with 
the liability rule or call option approach, although one that can be addressed through various mechanisms.  See 
Rose, supra note 138, at 2189 (citing and discussing Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 43); Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, 
Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996)). 
149 The possibility of using alienability restrictions to avoid strategic behavior is discussed in, e.g., Abraham 
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871 (2007); Ian Ayres & Kristin 
Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1999); 
Fennell, supra note 51.    
150 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 43, at 1042. 
151 See id. at 1043-44 (noting the possibility that option holders could misrepresent their valuations).  
Conversely, if the option holder learns that the original owner now values the entitlement far below the strike 
price, she might threaten not to exercise the option unless the original owner makes a supplemental payment that 
effectively drops the strike price.  See id.  
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would grant its holder a veto power. There is no guarantee that these 
bargaining sessions would end efficiently, but they might still feature lower 
transaction costs than the status quo.
152
    
After Time 2, the party exercising the option now owns the entitlement 
in question,  such as the solar easement in our example.  It remains to be 
seen, however, whether that entitlement will, over the long run, end up 
being more complementary to the new holder‘s property package, the 
original owner‘s property package, or the property package of some new 
and as yet unidentified claimant. Clearly, the option exchange should 
remain open and available to the optioning of ―secondhand‖ entitlements.  
For example, suppose Tooaytch in the story above decides to move away, 
and the new owners of their parcel have no interest in solar power and no 
need for the solar easement.  A simple ―flexibility payment,‖ similar to the 
one originally offered to Wunnell, could encourage these new owners to 
restore an option on the entitlement to the option exchange. This would help 
to ensure that the easement is eventually reunited with the original parcel if 
that is the efficient outcome, or transferred to yet another party if that 
becomes the efficient result.  
More than this might also be done, however, if we fear that the rigidity 
of veto rights (this time held by the entitlement‘s new owner) will cause 
entitlement patterns to become stuck in an inefficient equilibrium.  If one 
believes that the block that makes up a traditional property holding tends to 
be made up of highly complementary elements and that long-term 
complements deviating from that pattern are rare,
153
 then there could be 
reacquisition protocols that grant special rights of first refusal to original 
owners, that guarantee that later sales to them will be at a certain capped 
rate, or that otherwise limit alienability in an effort to prevent holdups.
154
   
                                                 
152 For example, the option exchange platform may let the parties find out about their mutual interest in the 
entitlement before any costs have been incurred in reliance, and could ease the logistics of interacting.  Ayres and 
Talley have also argued that bargaining may be easier in the shadow of a liability rule (here, the call option) than 
in the shadow of a property rule, because information about the original owner‘s valuation will be embedded the 
type of transaction she proposes (that is, whether she offers the option holder a payment not to exercise the option, 
or a payment to exercise it).  See id. at 1036-47.  This point has been disputed, however.  See Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995); 
see also Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of 
Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995) (responding to Kaplow and Shavell‘s critique).  In any event, a short 
exercise period that  limits opportunities for large valuation swings should help to reduce the risks of bargaining 
failure in the option‘s post-acquisition, pre-exercise period.  I thank  Ed Iacobucci for prompting me to consider 
these issues.   
153 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1175, 1185, 1196  (2006)  (discussing how the right to exclude may make specification of complements 
unnecessary in property, and noting the possibility that complementarity ―sometimes track[s] prelegal natural 
boundaries‖). 
154 See supra note 149.  Such an approach would ensure that the option exchange would not introduce an 
―anticommons‖ tragedy.  For background on the anticommons problem, see generally Michael Heller, The Tragedy 
of the Anticommons:  Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).  The core 
strategic dilemma associated with the anticommons is the holdout problem generated by the separate ownership of 
complementary fragments.  See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907 
(2004); see also James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies:  Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. 
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Sunsets on the transferred entitlements, after which ownership would 
automatically revert to the original owner, would be another possibility.
155
 
It is possible, however, that the spatial box will become an increasingly 
obsolete proxy for complementary entitlements.  In that case, we might 
refrain from granting special rights to the original entitlement holder but 
look for ways to more broadly add flexibility enhancers, like special 
auction-like protocols for further alienability.   
I have focused so far on using options to accomplish transfers to parties 
who intend to use the subject entitlements themselves.  But unless some 
limits were placed on the resale of options (and the underlying 
entitlements), the monopoly power of individual property owners might be 
replaced by the monopoly power of a party who aggressively buys up 
control of many entitlements of a certain type.
156
 To forestall this result, the 
option exchange might directly police who can buy options; for example, it 
might require that the acquisition of the underlying entitlement plausibly 
enhance the would-be buyer‘s own property.157  Another alternative would 
be to limit alienability, as through holding periods or resale protocols, in an 
effort to select for purchasers interested in personally using the 
entitlement.
158
     
The idea of adding alienability restrictions to constrain strategic 
behavior following an entitlement‘s initial optioning raises the question of 
whether directly applying such measures to all entitlements at present 
would be a better way to enhance flexibility. I think the answer is a 
qualified no, because we do not yet have good information about the kinds 
of entitlements for which such flexibility will ultimately prove most 
valuable.  Selective use of put options as that information begins to emerge 
can offer a lower-impact way to begin a transition from an unduly blocky 
conception of ownership.  But it is possible that an option exchange could 
be a transitional institution, and that in the longer run entitlements 
embedded with certain kinds of flexibility preservatives could, much like 
shatterproof glass, become the new standard.    
 
                                                                                                                            
& ECON. 1, 5 n.5 (2000).  The option exchange approach addresses this core problem by allowing entitlements that 
are in fact complementary (whether or not they are contained within the same spatial blocks) to be united more 
easily, through a voluntary rather than coercive process. Adding limitations going forward could ensure similarly 
easy reunification with the initial owner‘s block (or with any other holding to which the interest is 
complementary).   
155 See Rule, supra note 21, at 892-93 (recommending that solar easements be limited in duration).   
156 Cf. Banner, supra note 73, at 35 (describing the plot of Herbert Quick‘s 1909 novel, Virginia of the 
Airlanes, in which ―a mysterious enterprise called the Universal Nitrates and Air Products Company is found to 
have been quietly purchasing the air above farms, streets, and waterways all over the world, creating a plaid 
pattern made up of long strips of air ownership‖).  
157 In other words, the option exchange might contemplate only transfers of easements appurtenant, which 
would typically run with land.  See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 767-68 (7th ed. 2010). 
158 See, e.g., Fennell, supra  note 51, at 1440; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 51, at 953-54.  
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C.  Extensions 
 
While the solar versus sequoias example is not trivial, it is meant to 
illustrate a much broader set of possibilities for addressing unpriced draws 
against future flexibility. Consider a few ways that the notion of 
precautionary entitlement concessions could be extended.   
 
1. WYSIWYG-ing Land Use 
 
One way to think about the communication deficit flagged above
159
 is as 
a failure of the ―what you see is what you get‖ (―WYSIWYG‖) 160 principle 
that pervasively guides our physical interactions.  As we move about in the 
world, whether on foot or in a vehicle, our ability to avoid collisions 
depends crucially on getting accurate real-time information about the 
position of others relative to our own. A large fraction of ordinary (and 
usually unremarked) precautions are dependent on direct observation, which 
conveys information not only about where others are at a given point in 
time, but also about which direction they are moving, and at what speed.  So 
important is our reliance on WYSIWYG assumptions, in fact, that 
departures are usually flagged with warnings (e.g., ―objects in the mirror are 
closer than they appear‖ or ―hidden driveway‖).   In the land use arena, 
there is considerably less transparency, making it harder for land users to 
predict how best to avoid a conflict.  Zoning advances predictability,
161
 but 
it comes with some well-known costs.  Optioning specific entitlements like 
solar or view easements could surgically forestall known sources of 
conflict, as already discussed.  A more ambitious approach would involve 
transforming property holdings from opaque ―black boxes‖162 to 
WYSIWYG-compliant entitlement packages. 
How might this be accomplished? Suppose that a local governmental 
entity, instead of buying options on specific entitlements like solar 
easements, instead offered landowners payments for a bundle of options 
that collectively covered the inverse of all existing and planned uses—the 
empty space filling the owner‘s block of property after her own current and 
expected uses are spoken for. In effect, the owner would have the 
opportunity to place virtual shrinkwrap around both existing and planned 
                                                 
159 See supra Part I.B.3.   
160 Back in the early days of the personal computer, the acronym WYSIWYG (―what you see is what you 
get‖) defined an aspirational ideal—software that could display on the screen something that resembled the look 
of the printed document.     
161 See, e.g., White & Wittman, supra note 92, at 266 (―Spatial zoning has the advantage over prospective 
liability rules in that it shifts the burden of forecasting future land-use patterns from individual land users (and the 
courts retrospectively) to a planning authority.  It thus reduces uncertainty.‖).  
162 See Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American 
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 969 (2010); see also text accompanying notes 220-225, infra. 
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uses (with no distinction between the two) and option the balance. Under 
this inverse shrinkwrap or WYSIWYG approach, participating landowners 
might use a computer-assisted drawing program to define the spatial 
parameters they plan to permanently physically occupy
163
 and to indicate, 
using specified categories,
164
 the sets of uses they contemplate for those 
spaces.    
Significantly, this approach would not involve owners selling off 
everything in a given parcel‘s three-dimensional box that lies outside of the 
owner‘s current actual use, or even outside of her currently planned uses.  It 
would not even mean selling off an easement with respect to those  spaces 
and uses.  Rather, it would mean softening the edges of the property holding 
with respect to those spaces and uses by allowing neighboring owners to 
unilaterally acquire negative easements.  These other owners would be able 
acquire and exercise call options from the option exchange in which the 
WYSIWYG options have been deposited, thereby privately placing 
restrictions, at a price, on new uses and expansions that would interfere with 
the neighboring owner‘s own uses.165  
Here it becomes important to note the degree to which this approach 
tracks and diverges from existing arrangements. Governmental bodies 
already hold what amount to free options
166
 to add a fairly wide range of 
restrictions to the spaces and uses that owners have left fallow.
167
  At most, 
the government would be required to pay fair market value to restrict or 
acquire uses or spaces.
168
  But the government‘s use of such regulatory 
options effects an involuntary transfer of land use entitlements, which might 
be opposed on grounds of both efficiency and fairness in particular 
instances.  The resulting land use controls are also lumpy in nature; the 
switch is typically thrown for all parcels in a given zone or area, or not at 
all. As such, the tool may be too blunt to achieve the right level of 
precaution in contexts where small adjustments among neighbors are 
sufficient.  Allowing owners to voluntarily make options available as to 
unused entitlement space thus offers a distinctive alternative that might 
advance owner autonomy by reducing some of the pressures toward 
overbroad land use regulation.   
                                                 
163 As already suggested, many landowners use significant proportions of their land and airspace in a passive 
manner as a buffer or source of light and air, or for transient uses like kite-flying or frisbee tossing.    
164 For example, the categories used for zoning classifications might be used. 
165 Some limits would be necessary to avoid certain kinds of problems, like anticompetitive or spiteful option 
exercises.   
166 The option is free in the sense of not requiring a monetary payment.  There is a political price, although it 
may be negative in a given instance.   
167  See, e.g., Penn Central Transportation  Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
168  If a governmental restriction were held to amount to a regulatory taking, just compensation in the form of 
fair market value would be required by the Takings Clause.  See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman 
Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that ―‘just compensation‘ has been held to be satisfied by 
payment of market value‖).   
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2. Pay Me To Stand It 
 
Thus far, my examples have focused on cases where the precaution that 
keeps a given conflict from arising involves owners curtailing their own 
affirmative uses (that is, refraining from growing tall trees or building view-
blocking additions).  The WYSIWYG approach in the previous section is 
merely a generalization of that idea, again focusing on how ceding rights to 
certain externality-producing uses can reduce conflict. But curtailing uses 
that can cause offense is only one side of the interaction; there is also the 
question of one‘s willingness to withstand the potentially offensive use.  
Certainly, we might expect the most sensitive individuals to locate in places 
where they can acquire more rights to control what their neighbors do.  
Thus, the households that are most bent on solar energy would locate in 
places where they can acquire their neighbors‘ solar easements, the 
households that are most sensitive to changes in views would locate in 
places where they can acquire view easements, and laundries would locate 
next to businesses that are willing to alienate any right to emit.  Over time, 
this would tend to place those who are relatively less sensitive next to 
landowners who have not chosen to option control over their prospective 
uses.  But sorting could take place on a more fine-grained basis if we could 
work from the ―most insensitive‖ side of the spectrum as well, easing 
transactions between those who cause impacts and those best positioned to 
endure them.
169
   
How might this work? Limited instances already exist where those 
causing spillovers have offered payments to neighboring landowners in 
exchange for their acceptance of impacts.
170
  While it is easiest to imagine 
owners being willing to sell exposure to discrete impacts like wind turbine 
noise, tolerated impacts might also be framed in broader terms, such as 
certain decibel limits.
171
  Or some owners might offer options that would 
expose them to certain classes of impacts (barking dogs, say) only on 
condition that the same impacts be tolerated by the purchaser.
172
   
To be sure, these sorts of options raise a bevy of concerns that are not 
                                                 
169 Of course, sorting can also occur in response to actual or planned uses, with land prices playing a 
mediating role.  See  Vicki Been,   What‟s Fairness Got to Do With It?  Environmental Justice and the Siting of 
Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1016-18 (1993).  The difference here is that option 
sales could send signals that precede, and hence influence, actual land use choices, while also providing 
compensation to those who make themselves vulnerable to impacts.  Auction processes for making siting 
decisions offer a similar approach, albeit one that is typically envisioned as engaging collectives rather than 
individual households.  For discussion and critique of such siting proposals, see, for example, Been, supra, at 
1052-55.    
170 See, e.g., William Yardley, Turbines Too Loud? Here, Take $5,000, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2010 (reporting 
on energy company‘s payments of $5,000 to residents who signed a waiver agreeing not to complain about the 
noise of wind turbines).   
171 This would amount to the flip side of performance zoning, a kind of performance ―unzoning.‖   
172 This is a rough analogue of the ―share alike‖ feature in Creative Commons.   
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implicated, or at least not implicated as strongly, by agreements to yield 
incompatible active uses of one‘s own (like building sun-blocking 
structures) to facilitate passive uses (like solar collection).  Here, the 
situation is reversed: one agrees to yield one‘s own passive uses (such as 
enjoying peace and quiet) to the incompatible, active uses of others.  For 
one thing, being the first to announce a willingness to accept certain kinds 
of impacts could draw a disproportionate number of such impacts to one‘s 
doorstep.
173
  This makes it less clear precisely what one is giving up.  A 
similar result follows if information asymmetries exist or people are just not 
very good at predicting how certain kinds of impacts will affect their own 
preferred uses. The fact that people with more limited resources would be 
more likely to trade off quality of life for cash raises the same sorts of 
fairness concerns that we have seen in many other contexts, including those 
involving siting decisions.
174
  Finally, the underlying interest being optioned 
in this context does not correspond to a garden variety easement, but rather 
to an agreement not to complain about impacts.  While similar servitude-
like permanent damages have been awarded by courts,
175
 a market 
transaction that renders one‘s property permanently vulnerable to future 
impacts may differ in relevant respects from a remedial choice that is 
implemented after the impact is in evidence.
176
     
 
 
3. Putting Up With Abandonment 
 
Another potential source of inefficiency in land transactions involves 
property that no longer produces positive value for its owner.  Interestingly, 
the common law does not allow owners to abandon fee interests in land.
177
  
Assuming that another owner could put the property to better use, this 
nonwaivable indefinite continuation of ownership presents obvious 
inefficiencies.  Often this suboptimal ownership is ultimately resolved 
through forfeiture (whether due to  unpaid property taxes or an unpaid 
mortgage), but those processes have their own shortcomings.  Not only may 
they be protracted, the parties to whom the fee interest would be forfeited 
may have little interest in claiming it.
178
   
                                                 
173 Cf.  Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 829, 866 (noting how an adverse 
selection dynamic might impede certain moves toward less restrictive private community rules).   
174 See, e.g., Been, supra note 169, at 1016-18 (discussing the possibility that siting decisions induce moves 
that result in the clustering of lower-income populations near the locally undesirable land use).   
175 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (1970). 
176 The concern might go back to information asymmetries or uncertainty over the ultimate extent of the 
impacts.  I thank Eduardo Peñalver for discussions on this point and on the related issues raised in this paragraph.   
177 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 359–60, 399–402 (2010). 
178 See, e.g., Susan Saulny, Banks Starting to Walk Away on Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/us/30walkaway.html. One solution is to legally require the 
lienholder to take title.  See Strahilevitz, supra note 177, at 388. 
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There are other escape hatches as well—notably adverse possession and 
eminent domain.  Yet each of these involuntary transfer mechanisms comes 
with significant costs that can be traced to uncertainty about whether the 
existing owner is really a low-valuer.  This uncertainty creates a risk of 
undercompensation and, in the case of would-be adverse possessors, a risk 
of lost investment efforts.
179
  Yet the law provides low-valuing owners with 
no incentive to identify themselves and turn over their property voluntarily; 
indeed, it denies them even the simple expedient of formally renouncing 
their ownership and returning their property to the common pool.  Even (or 
perhaps especially) if we think that abandonment generates externalities that 
make policymakers reluctant to encourage it,
180
 a deposit-refund system 
could be usefully employed that involves paying for potential disposal costs 
upfront.
181
  Granting owners who later voluntarily relinquish ownership to a 
common bank a refund of part or all of an initial charge for disposal costs 
would remove the delay and guesswork that now accompanies transfers 
from very low-valuing owners to higher-valuing ones. 
 
4. The Problem of Assembly:  Lessons from Groupon 
 
Consistent with the road accident analogy, the analysis thus far has 
taken place at an extreme micro level, examining conflicts between two 
neighbors. This simplification has been helpful in illustrating how 
entitlements might be voluntarily adjusted to avoid conflicts, but it has done 
little to suggest how land use rigidities might be loosened on a broader 
scale.  To be sure, some unfreezing or unsticking would be expected if more 
fine-grained land use transactions make unnecessary broader-based, inertia-
producing land use controls like zoning and community-wide covenant 
schemes.  But because many efficient land use transitions depend on groups 
of nearby landowners agreeing on something (or having their objections 
overridden), the concept of precautionary land use entitlements will be most 
useful if it can harness coordination on a broader scale.   
A number of scholars have devised elaborate mechanisms for 
aggregating landowner consent through modifications to (or substitutes for) 
the eminent domain process.
182
 My goal here is neither to recount those 
                                                 
179 See Strahilevitz, supra note 177at 416-17. 
180 See id. at 400-01. 
181 See Tideman, supra note 26, at 347 (suggesting that ―any person who transformed a site in a way that 
made it expensive to restore that site to a condition of "bare land" could be required to post an interest-bearing 
bond that would run with the land, against the contingency that his site would be abandoned and require 
restoration‖).  Lior Strahilevitz makes a related suggestion: requiring abandoning owners to clearly mark off the 
property and publicize their intentions, with the possibility of favorable tax treatment (or avoiding a fine or 
penalty).  Strahilevitz, supra note 177, at 408-09.  Collecting the disposal fee in advance makes it easier to offer 
an attractive carrot for complying with such rules of proper disposition, and avoids the problem of trying to 
extract penalties from someone who is missing or insolvent.    
182 E.g., Michael A. Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 151 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (2008); Amnon 
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contributions nor to formulate a new, full-blown replacement for eminent 
domain.  Instead, I want to briefly suggest how the option exchange ideas 
developed here could be extended to aggregation problems, whether 
involving entire fee interests or smaller entitlements, through the use of 
mechanisms for collecting conditional or contingent consent.
183
  Contingent 
consent,
 
as I use the term,
184
 simply means agreement that is binding only if 
enough relevantly situated others also agree. A current example is found in 
Groupon‘s business model.185  On a daily basis, discount offers from local 
providers of goods and services, such as restaurants, theaters, and spas, are 
widely disseminated to subscribers, who can opt to accept the deal during a 
limited time (a day or so) or let it pass by.  In each case, the provider will 
have specified a minimum number of acceptances necessary to make the 
deal ―tip.‖  If not enough takers are found, the deal is off and none of the 
takers receives, or is bound by, the deal.
186
     
Although Groupon is fairly new, the idea it embodies is not.  It has long 
been recognized that a system that makes one party‘s contribution to a 
particular good contingent on the contributions of enough others can play a 
crucial role in collective funding settings.
187
  The technique is especially 
useful where ―step goods‖ are involved—goods like bridges that are of little 
value until a certain increment (enough to span the chasm) is provided.
188
  
Land use entitlements are often similarly ―lumpy‖ in that they are much 
more valuable when aggregated.  Unlike the funding mechanism for a 
bridge, however, the aggregation necessary in the land use context tends to 
be spatially sensitive.  Thus, if one wishes to run a very noisy machine that 
will bother one‘s ten closest neighbors, it is not enough to aggregate ―noisy 
machine consent‖ from ten random households in one‘s town; rather, you 
                                                                                                                            
Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704 (2007); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra 
note 149; Scott Duke Kominers & E. Glen Weyl, Concordance Among Holdouts (April 2010), available at 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~weyl/Holdout_4_10.pdf.   
183 The approach I discuss here is distinct from one in which entire communities would be given the 
opportunity to exercise a given option.  See, e.g., Rule, supra note 105, at 49-54 (describing a ―Green Community 
Tax Credit‖ that might be offered by the state to communities that accommodate renewable energy uses).   
184 Margaret Levi uses the term ―contingent consent‖ in a slightly different but analogous way.  MARGARET 
LEVI, CONSENT, DISSENT, AND PATRIOTISM 19 (1997) (defining ―contingent consent‖ as ―a citizen‘s decision to 
comply or volunteer in response to demands from a government only if she perceives government as trustworthy 
and she is satisfied other citizens are also engaging in ethical reciprocity‖).    
185 See Groupon, Learn How Groupon Works, http://www.groupon.com/learn. 
186 See id.; see also Felix Salmon, Grouponomics, May 4, 2011 14:23, available at 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/05/04/grouponomics (analyzing Groupon‘s business model).   
187 See, e.g., JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 42 (1989);  Mark Bagnoli 
& Michael McKee, Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods, 29 ECON. 
INQUIRY 351 (1991).  Indeed, Groupon‘s predecessor was The Point, which harnesses collective action in just 
such a manner.  See G-Team: Groupon + The Point, http://www.groupon.com/g-team; The Point: Make 
Something  Happen, http://www.thepoint.com/.   
188 See, e.g., Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of 
Public-Goods Provision, 30 POLIT. STUD. 350 (1982); Russell Hardin, Group Provision of Step Goods, 21 
BEHAV. SCI. 101 (1976); Jean Hampton, Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods, 3 ECON. & 
PHIL. 245 (1987). 
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need those ten nearest neighbors to consent.
189
 And it is well-known that 
holdout problems can preclude assembly of such consent.
190
   
What drives the holdout dynamic in multi-player aggregation settings 
boils down to the leverage that can be obtained by holding the last piece of 
a very valuable assembly.
191
 Thus, one promising avenue is to make that 
leverage unavailable through mechanisms like ―most favored nations‖ 
clauses that promise everyone who consents to a given assembly an equally 
valuable share of the assembly surplus, regardless of whether they agree to 
the deal early or late in the game.
192
  Heterogeneity in valuation and other 
difficulties often make this approach (and others that similarly rely on pre-
established divisions of surplus) hard to operationalize.
193
 Hybrid 
approaches in which contingent consent triggers coercion once a certain 
numeric threshold is reached offer an alternative.  Compulsory unitization 
of oil and gas interests is a prominent real-world example of this 
approach.
194
   
A proposal by Peter Colwell works through another incarnation of this 
idea—a type of ―tender offer‖ that might be made by a developer who 
wished to intensify use beyond the bounds permitted by existing law.
195
  In 
Groupon-like fashion, the developer sends letters to the neighbors offering 
them money for their consent, but explaining that the deal will only ―tip‖ 
when a certain percentage (say, 80%) agree; otherwise the deal is off.
196
   
The story doesn‘t end when the deal tips, however.  With as few as 80% of 
the neighbors in agreement, something more is necessary, and that 
something more turns out to involve overriding the consent of those who 
did not accept the offer.  In an interesting twist on the ―most favored nation‖ 
approach, those who did not voluntarily accept the offer receive a somewhat 
lower amount than those who did, again to counter the usual holdout 
dynamic.
197
 It is unsurprising that Colwell‘s proposal, like most other 
                                                 
189 This assumes that each of the neighbors would have the right to block the noise in a nuisance action, 
which might or might not be the case.  
190 See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, The Institutional Structure of Externality, 14 PUBLIC CHOICE 69, 73-74 
(1973). 
191 See, e.g., Becker-Posner Blog, The Kelo Case, Public Use, and Eminent Domain--Posner Comment, June 
26, 2005, 9:09 p.m.,  http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2005/06/the-kelo-case-public-use-and-eminent-domain-
-posner-comment.html (describing right-of-way settings in which each owner ―hopes to be the last holdout after 
the company has purchased an easement from every other landowner--easements that will be worthless if it 
doesn't obtain an easement from that last holdout‖). 
192 See Douglas Gary Lichtman, Patent Holdouts in the Standard-Setting Process, Academic Advisory 
Council Bulletin (Progress & Freedom Found., Washington, D.C.), May 2006, at 4, http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/ip/bulletins/bulletin1.3patent.pdf (describing this approach in the patent context).  
193 See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, 
CONFLICT, AND LAW 142, 156-65 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, eds., 2003) (discussing problems 
negotiating prospective division of proceeds and costs in the unitization context).    
194  See id. at 161-62 (discussing compulsory unitization). 
195 Peter F. Colwell, Tender Mercies: Efficient and Equitable Land Use Change, 25 REAL ESTATE ECON. 
525 (1997).   
196 Id. at 532-33.   
197 Id. at 531 
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serious attempts to address aggregation problems in land use,  contains an 
element of coercion (via supermajority rule) to get the job done.
198
  A 
requirement of unanimous agreement sets a very high bar, and one that is 
likely to keep property entitlements stuck indefinitely in low-valued uses.
199
  
Put another way, we should not be surprised that coercion cannot be 
avoided altogether in reconfiguring property rights, if we understand 
ownership itself as involving a kind of coercion that operates against the 
rest of the world.   
Nonetheless, a precautionary take on property rights might lead us to 
ask what kinds of voluntary entitlement reconfigurations would cost-
effectively reduce the need for coercive realignments.  Instead of attempting 
to construct a system that would fully substitute for familiar coercive 
mechanisms like zoning, eminent domain, and the use of  damages remedies 
(liability rules) to override neighbor objections, we might consider instead 
how small innovations could make resort to those devices less necessary.  
An option exchange that offers a platform for non-coercive Groupon-like 
offerings in land use rights is an unexplored alternative.  In cases where 
multiple configurations would suffice, a system for collecting options can 
offer a relatively low-cost way of determining how best to proceed.
200
 
Voluntary platforms for assembling relinquished veto rights could prove 
especially useful for projects that do not exhibit strict spatial 
complementarity (that is, where something under 100% participation would 
provide substantial benefits).  
 
5. Quitclaiming 
 
The discussion to this point has assumed, counterfactually, that the 
property rights in question are clear-cut as a legal matter and transparent to 
the parties.  Often, this will not be the case.
201
  Here the possibility that 
                                                 
198 Id.; see also Libecap, supra note 193, at 161-62 (compulsory unitization); Heller & Hills, supra note, at 
182, at 1520-25 (discussing overrides of dissenters in land assembly districts and a number of related institutional 
structures); Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private 
Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 834 (1999) (supermajority 
rule for superimposing newly created neighborhood associations onto existing communities and binding all 
residents to the association‘s charter).   
199 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 63-72 & figs. 1-3 (1962) (discussing and illustrating the tradeoffs associated with 
moving away from a unanimity rule); see also Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real 
Property Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 
1525, 1580 (2007) (―Eminent domain in the redevelopment context has been the public‘s key trump card to meet 
community needs, address market imperfections and holdouts, and advance the civic condition.‖).     
200 See text accompanying infra note 211 (discussing similar uses of options for pipelines).  Options allow 
would-be assemblers to test the viability of various assemblies at relatively low cost, rather than being daunted by 
the prospect of encountering a holdout.  Even if would-be holdouts exist in each potential assembly area, the 
bargaining power of each will be diminished by the competition provided by those in other potential assembly 
areas.  I thank Ted Seto and Ed Iacobucci for discussions on these points.  
201 See generally Sterk, supra note 11. 
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parties might give up something that they may or may not actually own 
becomes interesting.  The law already contains a mechanism that lets people 
do precisely this when conveying real property: the quitclaim deed.  Such a 
deed amounts to a release of one‘s own claim, if any, on the property.  
Quitclaims can also convey interests less expansive than full fee estates.
202
  
For obvious reasons, a conveyance by quitclaim can be risky for the buyer; 
there may be another claimant in the woodwork.
203
  Quitclaims are most 
useful where the person granting it is the only plausible claimant, aside 
from the recipient.  In many cases involving potentially conflicting land 
uses, this criterion could be met.  Hence, in the tree-solar example, the fact 
that the law might be unclear about whose interests will dominate in the 
event of a conflict would not preclude a precautionary quitclaim of a solar 
easement from the would-be tree grower to the would-be solar power user, 
or vice versa.   
Of course, where incompatible uses are known, the government can 
simultaneously clarify rights and offer to buy options to transfer them.  
Where conflicting uses are yet unknown, the government can nonetheless 
facilitate broad and bundled relinquishments of the sort associated with the 
WYSIWYG alternative.
204
  Some of what an owner cedes monopoly control 
over may not really turn out to be within her package of entitlements (or, as 
already suggested, might be removed from her bundle by regulatory action 
at a later date).  Nonetheless, there are benefits of certainty and conflict 
avoidance that would be associated with a clear assignment of that element 
to another party.  And if the underlying transaction holds value, so too 
would an option interface to facilitate it.  To be sure, a land user who 
believes she does not need to purchase a given right can choose a different 
path—agitating for regulation or initiating (or provoking) a lawsuit, but 
those alternatives have costs of their own.   
Returning again to the accident analogy, it is clear that we constantly do 
the equivalent of quitclaiming in everyday life to avoid conflict.  We wave 
other motorists ahead of us, we step aside or stand still to let other 
pedestrians know that we are yielding to them, we pull our dogs to one side 
to avoid oncoming canines, and so on.  In most of these cases, it is uncertain 
who has the right of way, and thus unclear whether we are complying with a 
duty we owe or giving up a right that we possess, yet the system works 
                                                 
202 See, e.g., City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 4th 232, 256-57 (1996) (Mosk, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (―[A]ny interest in land that  can be conveyed by deed is conveyable by quitclaim 
deed. This includes an easement. . . . It even includes a reversionary interest such as a right to recover possession 
on breach of condition subsequent.) (citations omitted).   
203 Unsurprisingly, empirical work reflects a substantial discount for transfers subject to quitclaim deeds.  
See David Brasington & Robert F. Sarama, Deed Types, Mortgage Rates, and House Prices, 36 REAL ESTATE 
ECON. 587, 588 (2008) (finding, based on a data set of over 37,000 home sales, that ―[h]ouses selling with general 
warranty deeds sell for almost 100% more than those selling with quit claim deeds‖). 
204 See supra Part II.C.1.   
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tolerably well.
205
 Property is not currently set up in a way that makes 
similar informal adjustments easy to achieve, except where strong norms of 
neighborliness apply.  And even a sustained attitude of neighborliness 
cannot answer the antecedent question of whether two owners engaging in 
potential conflicting uses should be neighbors in the first place.  Setting up 
a system whereby owners can indicate their willingness to avoid 
confrontation over rights that they may or may not hold can add value in 
guiding those decisions. 
To be sure, there are a welter of issues that surround any approach to 
legal uncertainty, including this one. For one thing, any popularized 
protocol for dealing with uncertainty may alter the law itself.
206
  If people 
start routinely paying for solar easements, for example, the law might 
become less likely to grant solar users an entitlement to enjoy solar access 
gratis by, for example, prohibiting tall trees next door.  But it is not obvious 
why this way of resolving legal uncertainty presents a particular problem.
207
  
It is also possible that a ―paying for solar‖ norm would never emerge, given 
other ways that a system of options might interact with legal doctrine.  For 
instance, the concessionary signal given by the putative owner might seem 
to invite neighbors to enjoy the benefits of an unused and obviously low-
valued entitlement without paying for a transfer, especially when the law is 
uncertain about whether buying the easement is really necessary.
208
  
                                                 
205 Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 58, at 52-56 (examining how, in rural Shasta County, norms coupled with an 
ethic of ―live and let live‖ make legal rules largely irrelevant to day-to-day dealings).  Perhaps more directly 
analogous to the situation of a landowner purchasing an easement that might be granted for free in court, consider 
the many instances in which people make payments that may or may not be required, simply in order to avoid 
conflict: adding an extra stamp to a letter that is ambiguously close to a given weight limit, adding quarters to a 
parking meter on a holiday that parking officials may or may not recognize, taking a less aggressive stance on a 
tax matter, and so on.     
206 See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
882, 890-900 (2007) (describing a ―feedback loop‖ in which copyright licensing prompted by risk aversion yields 
licensing practices that produce doctrinal constrictions of fair use); Jennifer Rothman The Questionable Use of 
Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1946-67 (2007) (critiquing the use of custom in intellectual 
property law on a variety of grounds, including the potential for entrenchment).   
207 The objection to doctrinal drift in the intellectual property context stems from a normative view on how 
limited or expansive the underlying rights should be.  See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 206, at 993 (arguing that the 
existing feedback loops will stifle creativity and compromise culture).  Such drift would be equally undesirable in 
the land use context if we were certain that it would cause an augmentation of the entitlements of a party who is a 
lower-valuing user.  Hence, a good reason for opposing a system of options for airplane overflight rights would be 
a concern that a pattern of micropayments for flight paths would ensue that would entrench owners‘ ad coelum 
rights and make every nonpaying airline liable—a bad outcome if we are pretty certain that the airline is always 
the higher valuing user. But where we are uncertain which of two rival uses will prove more valuable in a given 
time and place, options offer an alternative to litigation and lobbying. Takings law also interacts with entitlement 
transfer mechanisms in interesting, and to some extent countervailing, ways. For example, government would be 
less able to override solar access rights wholesale (as by enacting a ―right to trees‖ law) if it had to pay just 
compensation to large numbers of people who have actually purchased solar easements thanks to an options 
system.  In this case, an entrenchment in the direction of solar access (through buying easements) would 
counterbalance the entrenchment in the direction of preexisting rights to grow trees that the solar access sales 
might be thought to produce. Compare this with the copyright case, where widespread purchase of unnecessary 
rights is thought to entrench the rights of copyright holders without producing any countervailing enhancement of 
the legal position of those purchasing the unneeded rights.  See id. 
208This issue exists to some degree whether the law is clear or not, but it is intensified where the law is 
uncertain and known to be so, for the reasons suggested in the text.   
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Thus, we might actually see the opposite norm—that of not paying for 
solar—emerge. An owner‘s willingness to cede monopoly rights over a 
solar easement against a background of legal uncertainty might reassure a 
neighboring solar power user that solar access is unlikely to be blocked.  It 
might seem implausible that an owner who signals that she doesn‘t much 
care about using her vertical space will risk losing a lawsuit and having to 
tear down improvements or destroy trees. Yet again, it is not clear why this 
is a particular problem.  If a land use conflict is successfully avoided, the 
precautionary goals behind the option system have been fulfilled, whether 
through the signaling just suggested or through a transferred quitclaim that 
clarifies rights in favor of the solar user.  
Going forward, a nonpaying solar user understands that legal 
uncertainty may be resolved against her, and thus understands that she 
invests in solar power at her own risk. She knows that her option-ceding 
neighbor may change his mind about trees, reclaim the option, and start a 
forest next door, or may sell to someone who will do so.  Moreover, she 
recognizes that the possibility the law will be resolved against her grows as 
more and more solar users choose to purchase options and as solar 
easements become a more and more commonplace object of commerce.  
Thus the ―rights accretion‖ and the ―concessionary signal‖ theories may to 
some degree counterbalance each other, and even if they do not do so 
perfectly, there is no reason to suppose that their combined effects will be 
more deleterious for the overall path of the law than the status quo blend of 
litigation and lobbying.   
 
 
III.   OBJECTIONS AND CONNECTIONS 
 
The ideas sketched above have opened up more avenues of inquiry than 
I can begin to pursue in this paper.  This final Part is devoted to offering 
some brief thoughts on two sets of issues that bear on the feasibility and 
normative desirability of precautionary entitlement design.  I begin by 
addressing some standard challenges, and then turn to discuss connections 
between the approach I suggest here and a variety of theoretical debates.   
 
A.  The Standard Questions 
 
The suggestion that governmental entities become involved in 
delivering new forms of entitlement customization must first address some 
predictable objections, starting with the standard query:  if this were such a 
good idea, wouldn‘t it already exist? Closely related is the question of 
whether government provision is really necessary or whether private 
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markets could suffice.  Another question is whether the approach taken here 
really adds anything new, or whether we already have mechanisms that do 
everything that I am suggesting is necessary.   
In fact, property entitlement customization does exist.  Easements and 
covenants are firmly established entries in the property lexicon.
209
 But for 
reasons already discussed, the most familiar incarnations of private 
covenants—networks of reciprocal restrictions that govern common interest 
communities—do not deliver the flexibility benefits that an option exchange 
could.  The same goes for zoning and other types of top-down regulation.   
While it is certainly true that individuals can transact in a more piecemeal 
manner over entitlements, these transactions tend to become costly at 
exactly the same moment that they become most valuable.  Private 
bargaining does sometimes occur, of course. To take a recent example, an 
energy company paid $5,000 to each household near its wind turbine 
operations that would agree not to complain about the noise.
210
  Indeed, 
private systems of options are sometimes used to sidestep later bargaining 
difficulties. Pipeline companies in some places use options acquisition 
along multiple viable routes to work around holdout problems.
211
 These 
cases, which involve the concentrated interest of a large entity that finds it 
cost-effective to assemble entitlements, largely prove the point, however: it 
is not realistic to suppose that individuals can initiate similar deals on a 
broad enough scale to be useful without some institutional assistance.   
Why don‘t we have institutions that can facilitate such trades, then? 
Setting up an exchange to trade in future flexibility, before that flexibility is 
needed, represents a type of public good.  Like a number of other 
undeveloped, innovative markets, the absence of a private option exchange 
might be attributed to the inability of innovators to capture enough of the 
gains associated with their innovations.
212
  The fact that entitlement trading 
must occur in the shadow of potential governmental action and over long 
time horizons could make expected returns to private innovators 
unsustainably low, especially given the significant up-front investment 
required to offer the initial put options described above.  Innovators may 
justifiably fear that property owners would be unwilling to try out a new 
system that will implicate their property rights over time without the 
                                                 
209 See, e.g.,  Merrill & Smith, supra note 215, at 35-38; Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism 
in Property Law,  61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1607 (2008). 
210 See, e.g., William Yardley, Turbines Too Loud? Here, Take $5,000, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2010.    
211See comment on Volokh Conspiracy, 7/5/05 at 11:42 a.m., 
http://volkh.com/posts/1120508864.shtml#6471; National Energy Board, Pipeline Regulation in Canada: A Guide 
for Landowners and the Public 13 (2003) http://www.neb.gc.ca/clf-
nsi/rsftyndthnvrnmnt/sfty/rfrncmtrl/pplnrgltnncnd-eng.pdf (explaining how and why companies might use option 
agreements rather than initially purchasing easements).   
212 See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING SOCIETY‘S 
LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS 207-08 (1993); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for 
Market Experimentation,  83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337 (2008).   
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imprimatur of a governmental entity.    
A related possibility is that other land use accident reduction 
mechanisms, notably zoning, have crowded out innovations in the domain 
of entitlement design.  Perhaps developed initially as a substitute for 
missing insurance markets,
213
 land use controls have now become 
entrenched institutional features, and ones that certain stakeholders and 
repeat players have a vested interest in maintaining.  The costs of these  
familiar land use control mechanisms are significantly externalized as well, 
making them appear artificially affordable.  Some of the external costs fall 
on other communities, as commentators have explored at great length.  But 
some of the costs also fall on people living in future periods, who will face 
a constrained set of spatial choices. 
These points, on their own, do not necessarily argue for public 
provision—subsidies might be used instead, coupled with a scaling back of 
public land use control.  But they do suggest why we might not see a private 
actor emerge to handle trades in future land use flexibility. Other 
considerations, however, point toward the desirability of a public option 
exchange.  One such consideration relates to the role of a central (even if 
geographically localized) system for delivering coordination and 
communication benefits,
214
 as well as for establishing and implementing a 
consistent methodology for pricing. This point relates to the interaction 
between an option exchange and the numerus clausus, one of the points of 
theoretical intersection taken up in the next subpart.     
 
B.  Property Theory Intersections 
 
The concept of precautionary entitlement design relates in interesting 
ways to, and is challenged by, several influential strains of property theory.    
 
1. The Numerus Clausus Doctrine, In Rem Rights, and Exclusion 
 
Perhaps the most direct challenge to the idea of a self-customizing 
approach to entitlements is found in a cluster of ideas associated with the 
work of Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill.  Because their approach has 
increasingly set the terms of property theory discourse, it is worth 
recounting in some detail. According to Merrill and Smith, property 
entitlements are sensibly constrained to a limited number of standardized 
                                                 
213 See Albert Breton, Neighborhood Selection and Zoning in ISSUES IN URBAN PUBLIC ECONOMICS 241, 249 
(Harold Hochman ed., 1973) (describing ―zoning and restrictive covenants‖ as ―imperfect substitutes‖ to 
insurance);  see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 10 (2001) (discussing this point and 
citing Breton, supra).    
214 See, e.g., Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J. L. ECON. & ORG.  401, 
425-28 (examining the role of a ―territorial monopoly‖ in property recordation or registration given that in rem 
rights are involved).   
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forms, consistent with the principle of numerus clausus, to economize on 
information costs.
215
 Unlike endlessly customizable contractual 
arrangements, property rights are in rem, ―good against the world,‖ and 
hence must speak in a simple and comprehensible language.
216
  Although 
variations from these standard-issue property blocks are possible—
property‘s lexicon includes easements, covenants, and so on—the basic 
forms are meant to simplify communication between owners and 
nonowners.
217
   
For Merrill and Smith, property primarily communicates the simple 
message to ―keep out.‖218  Their focus on exclusion thus fits neatly together 
with both in rem rights and the numerus clausus doctrine.  This is a 
fundamentally outward-facing vision of property.
219
  Blocky, standard-issue 
rights play an important role in the story, as further suggested by Smith‘s 
work on modularity.  For Smith, property is ―modular‖ in that it delegates 
packages of control to the owner in opaque chunks.
220
 That each ―module‖ 
conceals information—the owner‘s choice among a broad range of projects 
and endeavors—is a strength rather than a weakness on this account.221 The 
world at large need not concern itself (much) with what happens on the 
property, in Smith‘s view, because property‘s outer shell is outfitted with a 
clear ―keep off‖ sign that tells the rest of the world all it needs to know.222  
Putting together Merrill and Smith‘s emphasis on optimal 
standardization with Smith‘s focus on modularity leads to a view of 
property that might be summed up as follows:  Lego on the outside, Play-
Doh on the inside.
223
  What happens inside the entitlement boundaries is up 
                                                 
215 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 33-34 (2000) (suggesting that information cost savings  can be 
realized by standardizing nonobservable elements of ownership); Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 358 (arguing 
that, due to the ―informational burden‖ associated with in rem rights, ―property is required to come in 
standardized packages that the layperson can understand at low cost‖).   
216 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 215, at 35-38 (analogizing property rights to language and noting 
some limits to the analogy).   
217 See id. 
218 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 394-95.    
219 See Katz, supra note 39,  at 277 (―The focus of analysis for a boundary approach is on the position of 
non-owners, which it defines in terms of a general duty not to cross over the boundaries of objects one does not 
own.‖).   
220 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 5, 16-18 (2009);  
see also Smith, supra note 53, at 1728, 1754-55 (discussing property as delegation). 
221 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 162, at 969 (suggesting that  owners are generally better than outsiders at 
evaluating uses of property, so that  ―it makes sense to make ownership a black box for some purposes‖); Smith, 
supra note 220, at 17 (observing that information may be hidden within a module); Smith, supra note 153, at 1185 
(―Exclusion rights implement the ‗information hiding‘ or encapsulation that is the hallmark of modularity.‖). 
222 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 220, at 17; see also Smith, supra note 53, at 1728 (―On the dutyholder side, 
the message is a simple one - to ‗keep out.‘‖).  Smith recognizes that beyond this exclusionary core lies a 
periphery where more nuanced and use-specific governance rules apply. Far from dismissing the interests at the 
periphery as unimportant, he takes it as a sign of their importance that they have been able to escape the ―heavy 
gravitational pull of the exclusionary regime generally used to solve the basic need for stability and coordination.‖  
Smith, supra note 221, at 965. 
223 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 215 (discussing benefits of standardization);  Smith, supra note 
220, at 17 (noting the importance of the interface among modules and the relative unimportance to outsiders of 
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to the owner (within limits).  In contrast, the shape of the outer interface is 
very much a matter of public interest, since it implicates the interactions 
between and among owners and nonowners, as well as buyers and sellers 
far into the future.  Merrill and Smith‘s approach is not as stark as this brief 
summary might suggest—they fully recognize that governance mechanisms 
are required to control spillovers,
224
 and further acknowledge that 
informational advances like registries can alter the efficient balance 
between standardization and customization.
225
 Nonetheless, the potential 
tension between an exclusion-focused, standardized vision of property and 
technologies for facilitating owner-initiated entitlement customization 
should by now be evident.   
At one level, nothing in a platform for trading in entitlement options is 
inconsistent with numerus clausus, since the ultimate objects of exchange 
are familiar entries in the property stable: easements and covenants.
226
  But 
as I have argued in another context, mechanisms that dramatically lower the 
cost to the parties of altering property bundles are not the same creatures as 
old-fashioned pairwise bargains, even if the interests that are transacted 
over carry the same names.
227
 If the internalized cost of customization falls, 
we would expect to see more of it. We thus must give serious attention to 
the possibility that the resulting reduction in standardization levels would 
generate externalities for third parties in the form of higher information 
costs.
228
 Participants in a property system—those who buy, sell, hold, or fail 
to hold certain interests—bear much of the cost of administering the system, 
and these administrative costs are a crucial component in any cost 
minimization equation.
229
    
Yet as Glen Robinson has observed, it is far from clear how a 
standardized, limited menu does much, if anything, to reduce the costs of 
complying with or transacting over property rights.
230
  People need not 
know any details about how property is held to know that they hold no 
interest in it (beyond that which background principles may grant them, as 
through the public trust doctrine, or the doctrine of necessity).  Whether the 
                                                                                                                            
what happens inside); Smith, supra note 221, at 968-69 (same); Smith, supra  note 153, at 1197 (using the Lego 
analogy to explain how modularity facilitates combining different basic property interests).  An analogous 
distinction between the internal structuring of relationships and the external legal forms used by third parties is 
explored in Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1781-83 (2005).  
224 Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 394-95.   
225 Merrill & Smith, supra note 215, at 38-42. 
226 It should also be noted that nothing in the approach outlined here would preclude parties from continuing 
to transact over land use entitlements in the traditional way, completely outside of the option exchange.  Indeed, it 
is possible that the prices developed in the option exchange would provide a reference point for private 
negotiations that would help to facilitate transactions. This seems especially plausible if bargaining difficulties are 
often less a function of greed than of uncertainty over valuations and the fear of being ―suckered‖ in a negotiation.   
I thank Ted Seto for this point.      
227 Fennell, supra note 173, at 893-94. 
228 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 215, at 26-34.   
229 CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 28. 
230 Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1484-88 (2004). 
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farm next door is held in an unusual variant on the fee tail
231
 or in an 
ordinary fee simple absolute, nonowners know to keep off.
232
 Conversely, 
those buying property are likely to be concerned about, and apt to incur 
costs gathering information about, plenty of things that are not encapsulated 
within the standardized forms—the condition of the property, the exact 
shape and terrain of the land,
233
 the applicable zoning restrictions, and the 
ways in which elements like covenants and easements interact with a given 
fee estate.
234
 A government-run option exchange, which would include a 
centralized database of completed and contingent claims on the property, 
would not add materially to the burden of investigating a property‘s 
attributes.  Moreover, it would repay the effort with a great deal more 
clarity about the nature of neighbors‘ uses and plans, enriching at relatively 
low cost the information environment in which purchase decisions are 
made. An option exchange, then, seems to be just the sort of innovation that 
would justify a relaxation of the numerus clausus doctrine, even on Merrill 
and Smith‘s own account.235   
Another facet of Merrill and Smith‘s vision of property might be put in 
terms of complementary entitlement packages. Their rejection of the 
―bundle of rights‖ metaphor and its implicit suggestion that property 
entitlements can be endlessly combined and recombined in any old way is 
premised on the idea that property has a stable core of meaning.  This core 
is built on certain default sets of exclusion-based rights that fit together in 
ways that reduce information costs (here by relying primarily on the binary 
―on/off signals‖ that boundaries provide).236 These default packages can 
work well if they place under a single owner‘s control a set of entitlements 
that tend to be strongly complementary.
237
  But property in modern 
                                                 
231 For a case involving such an unusual interest, see Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1893), 
discussed in Merrill & Smith, supra note 215, at 20-21, 24-25. 
232 This seems to follow from Smith‘s own analysis.  See Smith, supra note 221, at 968 (―If I don't own 
Blackacre, most of the time I know to keep off regardless of what the owner's uses and plans are for the land.‖); 
see also Robinson,  supra note 230, at 1485 (noting Smith‘s recognition of the different informational needs of  
different ―audiences‖ and questioning  how standardization of forms is helpful).    
233 The spatial configuration of land represents another dimension along which standardization might 
usefully proceed.  See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck,  Land Demarcation Systems, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW  257 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (examining the impact 
of demarcation systems that generate land holdings in rectangular versus irregular configurations).   Nothing in 
the option exchange idea would be inconsistent with using regular, rectangular land holdings as ownership 
platforms from which use rights might be traded; on the contrary, maintaining regularly-shaped boundaries would 
ease administrative burdens in tracking alterations in use rights.   
234 Robinson, supra note 230, at 1487-88.  Merrill & Smith point out that some of the ways in which 
property fails to achieve standardization involve observable characteristics, such as parcel size or shape.  See 
Merrill and Smith, supra note 215, at 34.  But nonobservable elements can vary as well, as they recognize in 
discussing future interests that place various conditions on property.  See id. at 14; see also Robinson supra note 
230, at 1487-88 (noting that difficulties in assessing watch quality are similar in kind to difficulties that 
individuals might encounter in assessing an unusual timeshare arrangement involving the watch). 
235 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 215, at 38-42; see also Arruñada, supra note  214. 
236 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 973 
(2004) (explaining that ―an exclusion regime builds on simple on/off signals such as boundary crossings‖). 
237 See Smith, supra note 153, at 1185, 1196 (discussing interaction between complementarity and 
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metropolitan contexts is heavily interdependent; influences on value that 
emanate from beyond the corners of the property regularly eclipse on-site 
influences. This fact calls into question any assumption that the control 
rights within a particular spatial shape are strong complements. Indeed, 
traditional land use controls already belie any strong spatial 
complementarity over control rights located within the owner‘s physical 
boundaries; ownership prerogatives are regularly chipped away in favor of 
collective property rights held by the community.
238
   
What I suggest here is an ongoing and individualized process of finding 
what is complementary and what is not, based on the judgments that 
landowners themselves make. Because there are currently no good 
mechanisms for loosening monopoly control on undervalued components, 
what has been taken as strongly complementary may instead just be the 
product of inertia and the lack of useful market mechanisms.  At a 
minimum, the intuitive case for strong spatial complementarity has been 
significantly undermined.  Property is no longer a protected capsule in 
which the owner minds her own business; increasingly, what happens on or 
with property seems to be everyone‘s business.  The suggestion this essay 
makes is that we explore the middle ground between public regulation and 
private dominion to find out when elements within the traditional spatial 
confines are best held not by the parcel owner, and not by the community, 
but rather by one or a few neighbors.    
  
2. Incomplete Property Rights 
 
The ideas in this paper also intersect with theoretical work on 
incomplete property rights.
239
 Following the literature on incomplete 
contracts, this scholarship emphasizes the inevitable tradeoffs between 
―front end‖ definitions of rights and ―back end‖ dispute resolution costs 
arising from ill-defined rights.
240
  Thus, sharply defining rights ex ante—a 
form of precautionary entitlement design—might or might not be cost-
justified in a given context.
241
 On this account, conflicts brew when 
                                                                                                                            
exclusion); Smith, supra note 13, at S471 (observing that ―in general we would expect a tendency to see the world 
carved up into assets that embrace complementary sets of attributes, subject to the cost of doing so‖). 
238 See ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 15-18 (1977) (describing zoning as ―a 
collective property right‖); William A. Fischel, Equity and Efficiency Aspects of Zoning Reform, 27 PUB. POL'Y 
301, 302 (1979) (explaining that zoning transfers property rights from landowners to the community).   
239 See, e.g., Antonio Nicita et al. Towards a Theory of Incomplete Property Rights, American Law & Econ. 
Assoc. Ann. Meetings (2008) http://works.bepress.com/antonio_nicita/3;  Amnon Lehavi, The Dynamic Law of 
Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal Standards 27-44 (June 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1618768. 
240 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design,   
56 CASE W. RES. 187 (2005) (focusing on this tradeoff in the context of incomplete contracts).  Recent work 
examining this tradeoff in the property context includes Nicita et al., supra note 239, at 25 and Lehavi, supra note 
239, at 12-13.    
241 This insight builds on Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
354–55 (1967); see also Sterk, supra note 11. 
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property rights are left incomplete (as they always must be, at some level).  
Antonio Nicita and  his coauthors explain that as novel uses emerge, new 
―presumptive‖ rights accrue to owners based on the packages of rights they 
already hold.
242
  The process may continue conflict-free, or the rights of two 
or more owners may collide, generating externalities and calling out for a 
sharper property definition.
243
  
Incomplete property rights analysis offers one way of understanding 
emerging dilemmas like that between solar power users and tree growers; 
indeed, one of the examples that Nicita et al. discuss involves a tree that 
grows to block a view.
244
 But this analysis is incomplete to the extent that it 
suggests all externalities are a product of ill-defined rights.
245
 As the 
discussion above has emphasized, what makes property so conflict-prone is 
often the exact opposite—the fact that a person with a known right stands 
on it and refuses to budge, even when the right carries little value for her.
246
  
It is precisely this dynamic that has led some scholars to suggest that 
ambiguity in rights can actually improve bargaining.
247
   
With this caveat in mind, there are two important takeaway lessons for 
the current project from the incomplete property literature.  First is the basic 
but crucial point that sometimes pursuing a finer-grained property 
entitlement allocation ex ante will not be cost justified, whether because 
information about potential uses or conflicts is absent, or because the work 
of pinning down the respective rights exceeds the savings to be achieved 
from reducing conflicts.
248
  Second, however, and directly relevant to the 
option exchange platform, is the possibility that rights definition can be an 
ongoing process in which the parties themselves participate.  That 
                                                 
242 Nicita et al., supra note 239, at 13-15, 18.    
243 Id. at 15. The notion of presumptive rights shares some common ground with the principle of accession, 
which assigns rights to new property interests based on a prominent connection with existing property rights.  See 
Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 459 (2009).  But while 
accession has been described as providing clear and unique answers, see id. at 475-76, the presumptive rights 
developed by Nicita et al. may ultimately conflict, producing externalities.  See Nicita et al., supra note 239, at 15 
(―When two presumptive rights constitute a joint claim over a rival use they generate an externality‖) (emphasis 
in original). 
244 Nicita et al., supra note 239, at 12-14 (building on an example borrowed from Alchian, supra note 124); 
but see Lehavi, supra note 239, at 34 (challenging the characterization of this conflict as a ―new‖ dispute).   
245 See Nicita et al., supra note 239, at 26. 
246 See, e.g., Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. 
L. REV. 905, 968 (2010) (observing that ―bilateral monopoly problems exist even when property rights are well-
defined‖).  This problem could be characterized as a form of incompleteness:  incomplete specification of who 
owns the right to which share of the surplus from trade.  But this lack of specification is endemic to the notion of 
alienable, separately held entitlements—further specification of surplus division moves away from an economic 
model in which clearly defined rights are traded to one in which substitutes for trade are constructed.    
247 See Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules versus Standards, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995); 
Ayres & Talley, supra note 43, at 1027, 1034-35, 1073-78 (discussing and modeling this point, building on 
Johnston‘s insight); see also supra note 152 (discussing potential benefits of bargaining in the shadow of liability 
rules and noting disagreement in the literature).  
248 These costs include not only the ones that a legal system must incur to define and enforce rights, but also 
the costs that parties must incur to learn about these rights and how they apply in a given situation, and to track 
down the parties who hold them in order to negotiate a transfer.  See Sterk, supra note 11, at 1296 (noting that 
these latter costs would exist ―even when rules are, from an abstract legal perspective, crystal clear‖).   
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participation need not be limited to the polar extremes of bargaining and 
litigating, but can instead encompass a more nuanced interplay of signals 
and intentions that works to forestall conflicts as they begin to emerge.  It is 
again helpful to consider a timeline in which potentially incompatible uses 
initially appear without much direct conflict, then grow more and more 
prevalent in increasingly closer proximity until a resolution of some sort is 
required.  An option exchange can help to identify these emerging issues, 
reduce or delay conflicts over them, and provide data relevant to their 
ultimate resolution (whether through flexibly traded entitlements or through 
some other form of land use control).
249
   
 
3. Abuse of Right  
 
In recent theoretical work, Larissa Katz recommends addressing the 
costs of ownership in a different manner: by importing the civil law notion 
of ―abuse of right‖ as an independent limit on ownership prerogatives.250 
This approach would seek to identify and outlaw those instances in which 
ownership rights are being used in a socially harmful way to hold up 
efficient new uses or to engage in inefficient spillover-producing 
activities.
251
 If ownership can produce externalities, as I have suggested 
throughout this essay, abuse of right represents an effort to catch those 
externality generators who are producing the largest margins of  harm over 
benefit—the property rights equivalent of identifying people who throw 
their empty bottles into the roadway.  Yet, just as tracking down improper 
disposal can be costly—indeed, so costly that our goals may be better 
served by taxing all consumption and rewarding proper disposal—so too 
the task of determining when an owner is using entitlements improperly can 
generate excessive, and indeed prohibitive, costs.   
Outside of a narrow category of ―animus‖ situations, such as true spite 
fences, it is problematic to delineate what it means to be ―abusing‖ one‘s 
right as an owner.
252
 If we define ―abuse‖ as misstating one‘s reservation 
price in an effort to get a larger share of the gains from trade, virtually every 
member of a market economy would be guilty. Most people assume that 
ownership carries with it the preorgative to say things like ―I just can‘t part 
                                                 
249 We might learn, for example, that a given entitlement type is always or almost always more valuable in 
one party‘s hands than another‘s, as is the case for ordinary airplane overflights.  It might then become efficient to 
redefine default bundles so that the entitlement in question begins life in a different package than the one 
suggested by a ―geometric box.‖  See Sterk, supra note 12.  
250 Larissa M. Katz, A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Right (2010), unpublished manuscript available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1417955.      
251 See id. 
252 Katz argues for an abuse of right approach that would encompass both ―animus‖ and ―leverage‖ 
situations.  See id.  Although there may be proof problems in establishing animus, it is possible to draw a 
conceptual line around this category of actions by owners.  Not so for the ―leverage‖ category, which blends 
seamlessly into the ordinary bargaining that is generally thought to be an incident of ownership.   
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with this car for less than $8,000‖ even when $7,800 would really be 
sufficient. Indeed, as Katz herself puts it, ―[o]wnership is generally seen as 
conferring a bargaining chip.‖253  But a narrower definition of abusive 
leverage is as elusive as the broader definition is unworkable. The 
blockages that can dramatically impede efficient resolutions of land use 
disputes come down to nothing more than the misrepresentation of one‘s 
own reservation price (or an attempt to gain surplus based on the inferred 
reservation prices of others), under monopoly conditions.
254
   
Instead of attempting to tell ―good leverage‖ from ―bad leverage,‖ we 
might do better to recognize that all exercises of the veto rights conferred by 
ownership carry the potential to impose costs, insofar as they entrench a 
particular set of use rights to the exclusion of other, incompatible uses.  Far 
from being an indictment of ownership, this point merely captures how 
ownership works. Rather than condemn ownership for doing what it does, 
we should price ownership so as to capture the effects of what it does.  
Because paying that price will be relatively cheaper for those who are using 
property in ways that generate gains for themselves, most of the abusive 
uses of leverage that Katz condemns would be effectively deterred, without 
our having had to identify them as independently problematic or distinguish 
them from everyday uses of leverage that accompany ownership.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Property, alone among entitlement types, delivers a hefty dose of 
personal control over a chunk of space for a potentially unlimited span of 
time. Its accompanying veto power makes ownership incomparably 
valuable and uniquely hazardous. While this power makes possible a wide 
range of projects and endeavors,
255
 it also makes the rest of the world 
vulnerable to the ways in which that power may be deployed. Often the 
resulting collisions between power and vulnerability are efficient, but 
sometimes the power that property conveys is superfluous, of little or no 
value to the owners, but highly threatening to the potential projects of 
nonowners. This essay has focused on finding a way to render less 
                                                 
253 See id. at 39. 
254 See Harold Demsetz, Theoretical Efficiency in Pollution Control: Comments on Comments, 9 WESTERN 
ECON. J. 444 (1971);  see also Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?  1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 
22-25 (1972).  To be sure, we might distinguish especially egregious ―pay me to stop‖ scenarios.  In these cases, a 
user strategically engages in an activity that produces no net benefit for her, simply to extract money from her 
annoyed neighbor. For discussion of these tactics and some potential approaches to them, see Daniel B. Kelly, 
Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), draft available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1671692. The annoyer in these situations is misrepresenting not only the magnitude of 
her reservation price but also its sign, making the use itself, and not just her later posturing over it, socially 
wasteful.     
255 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 
1022 (2004) (explaining how exclusion protects a ―wide and indefinite range of uses‖).   
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hazardous these low-valued portions of the property package.   
The accident analogy is helpful in this endeavor. By forcing attention 
backwards to earlier decisions about the design of systems and entitlements, 
it draws attention to undertheorized accident avoidance techniques. Chief 
among these is entitlement design.  In its current form, property is well on 
its way to becoming a clunker that spews spatial externalities, maneuvers 
like a tank, and regularly stalls out, creating bottlenecks that require the 
societal equivalents of tow trucks to rearrange things by main force.  
Keeping the models limited and doors locked will indeed keep property 
legible and distinctive, but it may also consign it to irrelevance as the realm 
of governance grows ever larger and the role of exclusion shrinks. It does 
no good to insist that property maintain a pristine standardized form  on the 
outside if it will be gutted from within.  If we wish to keep property alive as 
a distinctive concept, it must be able to respond more sensitively and 
flexibly to competing, spatially sensitive demands.
256
  That means looking 
behind the ―keep off‖ signs to recognize and price the incursions into 
flexibility that underlie that message. 
As important as focusing attention in the right conceptual places is 
focusing attention on the right chooser.
257
  I have suggested that, rather than 
leave the property configurations up to collectives, parties (as potential least 
cost avoiders) might be given incentives to customize their own entitlement 
packages.  By doing so when (and only when) it is worthwhile for them, the 
total costs of land use accidents and their avoidance could be reduced. This 
essay has only begun to sketch how trading platforms in land use options 
might be constructed. But such transaction-cost mitigation systems are 
likely to become increasingly important if we hope to keep property on the 
road.   
                                                 
256 The relationship between flexibility and durability is a familiar but important theme in thinking about 
how institutions operate over time.  See, e.g., Korngold, supra note 199, at 1526-27 (recounting how Frank Lloyd 
Wright‘s Tokyo Imperial Hotel weathered the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake through the use of a ―floating 
foundation‖ and suggesting that legal doctrine should take to heart ―[t]hese lessons of flexibility and humility in 
the face of inevitable change and the unknown‖).  But see David Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (examining some of the costs of retaining flexibility).   
257 See Krier & Schwab, supra note 17, at 470-71 (setting forth and discussing a ―best-chooser axiom‖ that 
holds: ―All other things being equal, when liability rules are used the party who is the best chooser should be 
confronted with the decision whether or not to force a sale upon the other party‖).  What the analysis in this article 
suggests is that one party might be the best positioned to decide whether to cede monopoly control, while a 
different party might be in the best position to decide whether to complete a transaction following that 
relinquishment.   
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